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Italy was in the Gold Standard between December 1927 and its de facto exit in December 
1934. Furthermore from the late 1929 it was affected by an economic crisis comparable to those 
o f other European countries, from which it started to recover significantly only in 1935.
Hence, it would seem that as long as its currency was pegged to gold, the country was not 
able to recuperate from the Depression.
In this study, the credibility o f the commitment to the gold peg in the eyes o f the 
international financial markets and the consequences o f the crisis and thus also of the exchange 
rate policy in the industrial labour market have been investigated, also in the attempt to 
highlight the implications o f the country’s dictatorial political regime.
It has been found that international financial markets anticipated a devaluation o f the 
Italian currency from the autumn 1929. These estimated expectations seem consistent with the 
evidence gathered from documents o f the time (both from archival sources and from the 
financial press). However these opinions do not appear to have been based on the usually 
considered macroeconomic variables. It has been argued that it may have been the dictatorial 
nature o f the political regime to induce this markets’ behaviour.
Moreover despite the fact that during the Depression real labour costs do not seem to have 
increased beyond productivity in the industries more sheltered from international competition, 
further substantial reductions in nominal wages both in these industries and in those more 
exposed to international competition appear to have been needed to keep labour demand at its 
pre-crisis peak.
It has been argued that the Fascist government may have refrained from using more its 
powers to cut wages at least partly because the industries it was more interested in were less 
affected by problems o f rising real labour costs and because it could have been worried that 
further decreases in factory workers’ living standards could have generated social instability.
Both the evidence on financial markets’ expectations on the Italian lira-gold parity and that 
on the industrial labour market support the assertion that an earlier currency devaluation, 
accompanied by expansionary polices, could have been beneficial.
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INTRODUCTION
After World War I, the belief that a reintroduction o f the Gold Standard was needed for a 
return to the stability and prosperity o f the pre-war years (1870-1913) was very widespread (see, 
for example, Eichengreen, 1992b). Most countries therefore implemented policies needed to 
facilitate the repegging o f their currencies to gold, and by 1929 almost all developed market 
economies had achieved this objective.
Thus when the world crisis begun, at the end of 1929, the policy choices open to these 
governments were constrained by the commitment to remain in this international monetary 
system. Furthermore the strength o f this commitment differed across countries, depending, 
among other things, on: their previous experiences of inflation and currency depreciation; the 
costs o f the policies undergone to re-enter the system; and the perceived effect that this 
commitment had on the country’s international reputation.
In the last twenty five years a literature has developed on the relation between the Gold 
Standard and the world economic crisis, which includes, among the most influential 
contributions, Choudhri and Kochin (1980), Eichengreen (1984, 1992a, and 199b), Eichengreen 
and Sachs (1985), Hamilton (1988), Temin (1989), Bemanke and James (1991), and Bernanke 
(1995). These authors have argued that the constraints on national policies imposed by Gold 
Standard membership first prevented other countries from insulating themselves from the shock 
generated by the contractionary monetary policy implemented in the US in 1928, and then 
continued to make the unilateral adoption of expansionary policies impossible while the gold 
peg was maintained. The Gold Standard is therefore argued to have contributed not only to 
spreading the depression across countries, but also to prolonging and deepening it.
Italy was in the Gold Standard between December 1927 and its de facto exit in December 
1934 (the official currency devaluation happened later in October 1936). The re-pegging of its 
currency to gold was the successful outcome of policies aimed at ending a period o f inflation 
and currency depreciation and was considered by the Fascist dictatorship to be a means to 
improve the country’s international reputation. Furthermore, Italy was in its turn affected by an 
economic crisis comparable to those o f other European countries, from which it started to 
recover only in 1935, at the time of rearmament for the Ethiopian war (see, e.g., Toniolo, 1980). 
Hence, the Italian case would seem to be consistent with the argument put forward by the 
literature cited above that as long as a country was committed to remain in the Gold Standard it 
could not unilaterally implement expansionary policies.
In this study, the credibility o f this commitment in the eyes of the international financial 
markets and the consequences o f the crisis and thus also of the exchange rate policy for the 
labour market are investigated. In doing so we also highlight the implications of the country’s 
dictatorial political regime.
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In Chapter 1 the first o f these two issues is considered. As is discussed more extensively 
there, the choice o f the parities at which the various currencies re-entered the Gold Standard 
after World War I and its consequences have been object of much debate. The case o f the Italian 
lira can be considered in this context as one of a parity which around the time of the pegging 
was considered too high, but that was nevertheless maintained for quite some time.
An analysis o f the opinions and expectations of the international financial markets 
concerning the Italian lira-gold parity can supply evidence that is useful in assessing the 
difficulties experienced by the government in abiding by its commitment to remain in the Gold 
Standard, on the extent to which the constraints imposed by it on its policies were binding, and 
therefore also on the possible advantages o f an earlier devaluation. Moreover, a study o f the 
determinants o f these expectations also provides information on the scope for the government to 
change them via its policies, as opposed to the role played in their formation by its dictatorial 
nature.
There could have been a number o f ways in which the lack o f democracy o f the political 
regime may have influenced expectations formation. To begin with, a lower level of 
transparency in decision making could have made it harder for foreign observers to correctly 
weigh the relative importance of conflicting policy objectives. Furthermore, the censorship 
exerted by the Fascist regime could have increased the difficulties encountered by agents in 
international financial markets in assessing not only the reliability o f published information (in 
particular o f economic data supplied by official sources), but also the stability o f the political 
regime itself. Finally, the less than complete autonomy of the central bank from the executive, 
in particular in discount rate setting, could have led financial markets to think that there was 
more scope for this rate to be manoeuvred so as to satisfy also other government’s objectives, 
possibly conflicting with that of keeping the gold parity.
The financial markets expectations on the Italian lira-gold parity are estimated under the 
maintained assumption that the exchange rate regime can be interpreted as a target zone (at least 
during the period when also the British pound was pegged to gold, that is until September 
1931); as highlighted in the next chapter a similar interpretation of the classical and inter-war 
Gold Standards is also employed by a number of other authors. The results are then compared 
with evidence obtained from documents o f the time (both from an archive and from the 
international financial press).
In Chapter 2 the issue of whether Italian factory workers’ nominal wages were flexible 
enough to fully react to the large price changes and demand reductions characterising the 
economic crisis is investigated. The possibility that nominal wages did not react enough to price 
falls during the Great Depression has been considered by many scholars as one of the possible 
mechanisms through which nominal shocks could have affected real variables. Among the 
recent contributions to this literature are a study which considers twenty-two countries
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(Bemanke and Carey, 1996), one which concentrates on the US economy (Bordo, Erceg and 
Evans, 1997), and two on Italy (Mattesini and Quintieri, 1997, and Perri and Quadrini, 2002).
A similar focus is that o f the literature that studies the role o f insufficiently flexible 
nominal wages in explaining unemployment, of late using models with imperfect competition 
hypotheses for goods and labour markets. The analysis presented in Chapter 2 is also related to 
this literature. Furthermore it could contribute to understand the mechanisms that prevented a 
full adjustment o f nominal wages to price falls in Italy.
For all countries this is an issue of interest and debate in both strands o f the literature. 
Bemanke (1995), for example, has argued for the need to explain this phenomenon in the light 
of the fact that it would seem to imply irrational economic behaviour, because both employers 
and employees seem to have an incentive to renegotiate their contracts when facing 
unanticipated deflation.
When dealing with the labour market, the Italian government could use also policies that 
were not available to democratic ones. In particular, the Fascist executive could (and actually 
did on more than one occasion) cut all wages and salaries at once and by an amount specified by 
the executive itself. A priori it would seem that this facility could have been used to eliminate 
possible sources o f insufficient nominal wage flexibility such as coordination failures 
(mentioned for example by Eichengreen, 1992b), or institutional arrangements similar to those 
represented by Taylor’s (1980) overlapping contracts (and used to model nominal wage 
sluggishness during the Depression in the US by Bordo et al., 1997). It is part of the object of 
the analysis presented in Chapter 2 to understand which were the constraints limiting not only 
the possibility of making use o f these powers, but also the labour market policies o f the Italian 
government more generally.
Furthermore, an assessment o f the degree to which nominal wages failed to keep pace with 
price and demand reductions and o f the effects of these inflexibilities on labour demand could 
contribute to understanding the possible benefits which could have derived from an earlier 
abandonment of the gold peg and the reflationary policies which would have then been made 
feasible.
Finally, this study can be seen as contributing to the extant literature on the Italian labour 
market during the Great Depression, in particular by the incorporation o f the assumption of 
imperfect competition in output markets into the labour demand model, and by the distinction 
between industrial sectors more exposed to and more sheltered from international competition. 
This last feature would seem interesting due not only to the very different patterns o f output 
prices for the two sets of industries, but also to the fact that the relevance they had in the eyes of 
the government, and hence its policies towards them, were not the same.
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Chapter 1
THE ITALIAN LIRA IN THE INTER-WAR GOLD STANDARD: WAS THE 
DECEMBER 1927 PARITY CREDIBLE?
1.1. Introduction
On 18 August 1926 Mussolini announced his determination to stabilise the lira and 
introduce gold exchange convertibility. The exchange rate o f the Italian currency stood then at 
148 with respect to the British pound. The target lira-gold parity was announced in May 1927 to 
be 90 lira to the pound.
A set o f policies was implemented to achieve this objective, including the agreements on 
the repayment o f war debts with United States and United Kingdom, the restriction o f the right 
to issue legal tender to the Bank of Italy only, strict monetary and fiscal policies, the forced 
consolidation of the short term public debt and cuts by authority to all wages and prices.
The markets reacted by generating a strong nominal appreciation of the lira: the lira/UK 
pound exchange rate appreciated to 108 at the end o f December 1926; it was still 107 at the end 
o f March 1927, but then, after the stabilisation target had been declared, at the end o f May, the 
lira appreciated further, reaching a low of 84 at the end o f June 1927; from then on it stayed 
around 89 until just before 21 December 1927 (see Einzig, 1937, Appendix I).
In this date the Italian currency was officially pegged to gold, at a parity o f 92.46 lira to the 
UK pound.
However the general opinion expressed at the time was that such a parity would have been 
unsustainable. Among the others, it was manifested by Bank of England and New York Federal 
Reserve Bank officers (see, respectively, De Cecco, 1993, p. 67, and doc. 21 therein), the 
Morgan’s Bank (see doc. 148 in De Cecco, 1993). Furthermore it was widespread among the 
financial communities in London and New York (see, for example, the reports by the Bank of 
Italy’s delegates there, respectively in doc. 17 in De Cecco, 1993, and Bank of Italy’s Historical 
Archive,1 Carte Stringher, cart. 23, 402/3/01), and manifested also by the Italian business 
community.
Nevertheless it was only in December 1934 that the lira convertibility was de facto ended 
(when the monopoly in foreign exchange transactions was granted to a public law institution, 
the Italian National Institute o f Foreign Exchange). Then, in July 1935, the 40 per cent backing 
o f Bank of Italy’s sight liabilities with gold and gold exchange reserves requirement was 
suspended. Finally, the Italian currency was devalued de jure on 5 October 1936.
A contradiction between the opinions held by influential institutions and economic agents 
on the chosen lira-gold parity at the time of its setting, on the one hand, and the actual capability
1 Henceforth ASBI.
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of the Fascist regime to defend this parity beyond the devaluations o f the UK and US 
currencies, on the other, seems to have been there.
In this chapter, the effects o f the chosen Italian lira-gold parity not only on the exchange 
rate stability, but also on financial markets’ agents’ expectations on its sustainability are studied.
The issue o f the appropriateness o f the gold parities at which the various currencies re­
entered the Gold Standard after World War I was not only crucial at the time, but also object of 
a number o f studies afterwards. Lively debates have developed on whether the British return to 
the pre-war gold parity caused an overvaluation o f the currency, and whether the French inter­
war parity was lower than prices would have allowed (see, for example, Keynes, 1925 and 
1926, Wolfe, 1951, Sayers, 1970, Eichengreen, 1982, Sicsic, 1992, Redmond, 1984, and 
Matthews, 1986 and 1989). The effects of the likely misalignment o f these two currencies 
manifested themselves, for example, in the gold movements from the United Kingdom to 
France, which caused the famous contrasts between the two central banks’ Governors, Montagu 
Norman and Emile Moreau (see, for example, Sayers, 1976, and Eichengreen, 1992b).
The case o f Italian lira studied here can therefore be considered in this context of 
controversial choices o f the appropriate parities as one where prima facie the set parity seems to 
have been too high, but it was maintained until a quite late date.
In Section 1.2 a technical summary o f how Italy’s gold exchange standard actually worked, 
based also on some new estimates o f gold points, is presented to verily the hypothesis that it 
was a target zone. In Section 1.3, the credibility o f the Italian lira-gold parity in the eyes o f the 
financial markets’ agents is assessed, by comparing the expected change in the parity, estimated 
in a target zone framework, with the evidence contained in archive documents written at the 
time. In Section 1.4, an analysis of the determinants o f devaluation expectations is conducted, 
based on models o f balance of payments and exchange rate determination. Section 1.5 
concludes the chapter.
1.2. Was the Italian Lira Exchange Rate Regime a Target Zone?
Recent studies have interpreted the classical and the inter-war Gold Standards as target 
zones, that is as exchange rate regimes where each exchange rate could fluctuate only within a 
band. The target zone model has been initially proposed by Krugman (1988) to describe 
exchange rate regimes such as the ERM of the EMS, where the band is determined by the 
member countries and is constant over time. In both the classical and the inter-war Gold 
Standards, the band was the spread between gold import and export points and therefore varied
2 However, references to target zones had already been made by Keynes (1930). For a description of a 
base line target zone model, see also Krugman (1991) and Miller and Weller (1991). The explicit 
reference to the ERM does not appear in Krugman (1988), but it does appear for example in Miller and 
Weller (1991).
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with time. Furthermore, the gold parity was not necessarily equal to the mean o f the gold import 
and export points. Recent studies where the classical or inter-war Gold Standard have been 
interpreted as a target zone are Flood, Rose and Mathieson (1991), Giovannini (1993), 
Hailwood, MacDonald and Marsh (1996, 1997) and Bordo and MacDonald (1997).
In particular, Hailwood, MacDonald and Marsh (1996, 1997) have studied various 
exchange rates (but not those o f the Italian lira) during both the classical and inter-war Gold 
Standard, to assess whether the gold parities were credible or changes were expected and what 
were the determinants o f these expected changes. They have employed the method proposed by 
Bertola and Svensson (1993) to estimate the time-varying expectations of gold parity changes. 
This method is that used also in this chapter, and briefly described in the following Section.
From Section 1.1 it would seem that the Italian lira was in a gold exchange standard and 
hence in a target zone regime, from December 1927 to December 1934.
To check that this hypothesis actually held, it is necessary to obtain at least some estimates 
o f the market determined gold points, with respect to as many currencies as possible, and then 
to measure the size o f gold point violations.
The gold points are the exchange rates beyond which it becomes profitable to buy gold in 
one country and transport it to the other for sale. The gold transfer can happen as a substitute 
for, or as a complement to, a foreign exchange transaction. The gold points are determined by 
the costs involved in the gold transfer (and in the possible foreign exchange transaction in the 
opposite direction).
Furthermore, they are affected by the existence o f limits to capital movements and to the 
possibility o f obtaining gold rather than foreign currencies convertible into gold in exchange for 
the domestic currency. Both these types of restrictions increase gold export costs. If limits to 
capital export exist, agents wishing to exploit the profit opportunities from gold export may be 
unable to do so legally. In this situation, gold export costs include the costs that need to be 
incurred in getting round the law and so they are higher than, under free capital movement. If a 
central bank restricts the agents’ possibilities of obtaining gold, rather than foreign currencies 
convertible into gold, in exchange for the domestic currency, an agent wishing to exploit the 
profit opportunities of gold export may have to go to the central bank issuing the foreign 
currency to exchange it for gold before being able to transfer the gold into the final destination 
country for sale to its central bank. The additional transactions involved raise total gold export 
costs.
Official Bank of Italy’s documents stated that the convertibility o f the Italian lira would 
have been limited to foreign currencies only (Storaci, 1989, p. 283).
3 For a detailed analysis o f the costs involved in the gold transfers and on how the gold points should be 
calculated, see Officer (1996).
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Furthermore, until March 1930, the convertibility o f the lira into foreign currencies was 
further limited by restrictions on foreign exchange transactions introduced before the gold peg.
These restrictions on convertibility imply that, throughout the entire period when the lira 
was pegged to gold, the gold export points were at a greater distance from the parities than they 
would have been had convertibility been full. The additional costs are difficult to estimate, but it 
would seem sensible to argue that they decreased after the restoration o f full capital mobility in 
March 1930 and that they may have progressively increased again after September 1931, when 
the authorities tried to make it more difficult to buy foreign currencies via guidelines to the 
banks. During the entire period when the lira was in the gold exchange standard, gold exports 
needed to involve three countries. In addition, before March 1930 and maybe also after 
September 1931, gold export costs included also the costs o f getting round the law restricting 
the availability o f foreign currencies.
On the basis o f the data on costs of gold transfers to and from Italy found in ASBI 
documents and of interest rates, estimates of gold points for the lira exchange rates with respect 
to US dollar, UK pound and French franc have been calculated (as it is reported in detail in 
Appendix A .l).
None o f these estimates take into account the additional costs arising because of 
convertibility restrictions, so the estimated gold export points should be considered as lower 
bounds for the actual values.
The estimates o f gold points for the lira/dollar exchange rate (whose parity was 19 lira to 
one dollar) have been calculated on the basis of data on the costs o f gold transfers between Italy 
and New York in the early 1928 and in late 1932 or early 1933, found in ASBI documents (in 
particular, in ASBI, Introna Ispettore, pratt., n. 3, fasc. 1 and ASBI, Rapporti con FEstero, pratt., 
n. 342, fasc. 8). The gold import point estimates lie in the range [18.888; 18.918], while the gold 
export point estimates lie in the range [19.083; 19.114].
The lira/pound gold points have been estimated at 92.17 and 92.75 lira to the pound on the 
basis o f only one document, written in September 1928 (ASBI, Rapporti con l’Estero, cpl., n.
143).
A series o f documents (found in ASBI, Rapporti con l’Estero, pratt., n. 342, fasc. 8), 
written during 1933 and containing the elements of cost relative to gold transfers between Paris 
and Rome, has allowed the calculation of gold import and export point estimates for the 
lira/French franc lying respectively in the ranges [72.870; 74.321] and [74.560; 76.004] (the 
central parity being equal to 74.44 lira to 100 French francs).
These gold point estimates have been compared with end-of-month data on spot, one- 
month-ahead and three-month-ahead forward exchange rates (obtained from Einzig, 1937, 
Appendix I).
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For all three exchange rates, gold points estimates were at most violated by small 
percentages (below one) in the period January 1928-August 1931. However, after the pound 
abandoned the gold peg the lira was very often substantially weaker than the estimated export 
points with respect to the dollar and the French franc.
Therefore, it would seem possible to argue that before September 1931 the violations of 
the gold points do not impair the interpretation o f the lira exchange rate regime as a target zone. 
All the more so in the light o f the observation that very small extra costs o f gold export due to 
the convertibility restrictions would be enough for the conclusion that no violation o f the export 
points occurred to be warranted.
However, the target zone hypothesis does not seem to have held after September 1931.
Hence, the period December 1927-August 1931 is that on which the analysis o f the 
credibility o f the lira-gold parity in the framework o f a target zone is conducted.
The hypothesis that the lira exchange rate regime changed after September 1931 is 
consistent with the characterisation o f it given by the Governor o f the Bank of Italy in his report 
to the Bank’s shareholders in 1932, where he wrote that since the sterling devaluation the lira 
was on a “tempered Gold Standard” and “the period o f effective application o f the gold 
exchange standard” was to be considered “closed” (see Banca d ’ltalia, Adunanza generate degli 
azionisti, Rome, March 1933, pp. 37-38, and the references to it in Cotula and Spaventa, 1993, 
p. 187, and in Raitano, 1995, note 144, p. 318).
It is also consistent with De Cecco’s (1993) description o f how Italian authorities reacted 
to the pound crisis. In particular, he has written that “Italian authorities tried [...] to protect their 
reserves by widening the lira fluctuation band against the dollar well beyond the gold points 
[...]. Many contemporary sources gave testimony about such a policy” (p. 101).
Furthermore, the hypothesis that the international inter-war Gold Standard was modified 
by the pound crisis has been made by Hailwood et al. (1996). They have argued that “the 
pound-dollar exchange rate was still dominant in the interwar period” and therefore have 
restricted their analysis o f the credibility o f the inter-war Gold Standard to the period May 
1925-August 1931, even for the dollar exchange rates with currencies that remained pegged to 
gold for longer, such as the French franc.
The hypothesis o f a change in the international exchange rate regime, after the sterling 
crisis o f September 1931, can be rationalised by observing that for each country, the costs and 
benefits of being inside or outside an exchange rate regime depend on the number and the 
importance of the other member countries. In September 1931, not only was the pound no 
longer pegged against gold, so that the target zone regime of the pound/dollar rate, the most 
important exchange rate in the system, came to an end, but twenty-five currencies (including 
those o f Empire countries, but also Scandinavia, Eastern Europe and Latin America) followed 
the pound in leaving gold. Hence, it would seem reasonable to argue not only that the countries
13
remaining in the Gold Standard experienced an increase in the economic costs of sticking to the 
gold parity (e.g. because of the negative effect of the other currencies’ depreciations on their 
external trade balance), but also that the political costs of suspending the convertibility 
simultaneously decreased.4
1.3. Assessing the Credibility of the Lira-Gold Parity
1.3.1. The Method
The credibility o f the Italian lira-gold parity between 2 1 December 1927 and 20 September 
1931 is assessed by studying whether agents in the financial markets expected the implied 
parities of the Italian currency with respect to the US dollar, the UK pound and the French franc 
to change in the following one month and three months. Agents’ expected changes in these 
implied parities are estimated via the Bertola and Svensson’s ( l 993) ‘drift-adjustment’ method 
which is as follows.
Let st be the natural logarithm of the current spot exchange rate and ct the natural logarithm 
o f the central parity, then xt, defined as
(1.1) xt := st- ct,
is the proportionate deviation o f the exchange rate from ct (xt is commonly referred to as the 
exchange rate within the band). The rationally expected total change in the exchange rate (Et[A 
st]/At) can therefore be decomposed into the expected fluctuation within the band (Et[Axt]/At) 
and the expected change in the central parity, or expected realignment (Et[Act]/At):
(1.2) E t [Ast ]/ At = E t [Axt ]/A t + E t [Act ] /A t,
where Et indicates the expectation conditional on the information available at time t. Therefore, 
the expected realignment can be calculated by subtracting an estimate o f the expected 
fluctuation within the band from the total expected change in the spot rate.
This method has been applied to investigate the credibility o f recent target zones, in 
particular by Rose and Svensson (l 991), Lindberg, Svensson and Soderlind (l 991), Svensson 
(l 993), Giovannini (l 993) and Caramazza ( l 993); but also that of the classical and inter-war 
Gold Standards, in particular by Giovannini ( l 993), Hailwood et al. (1996, 1997, 2000a, 2000b) 
and, in a variant, by Hsieh and Romer (2001).
Under the assumption of uncovered interest parity, Et[Ast]/At is equal to the differential 
between the domestic and the foreign interest rate on similar assets, maturing at t+At.
4 Similar arguments have been put forward to explain currency crises, in particular by Obstfeld (l 994,
1996).
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Furthermore, the forward exchange premium over the interval At can also be used as a 
measure o f Et[Ast]/At, even when there is risk aversion and the covered interest parity holds, but 
the uncovered interest parity does not.
The credibility of the Italian lira-gold parity is tested here using forward exchange premia 
to measure Et[Ast]/At, because o f the lack o f data on suitable Italian short term interest rates.
In Bertola and Svensson’s (1993) target zone model, Et[Axt]/ At can be estimated by the 
fitted values of the following regression:
However, more general specifications have also been considered in tests of the credibility 
of recent target zones.
In this chapter, the following equation for Et[Axt]/At is used:
where i, j  and k indicate the three lira exchange rates, and ftj/\ t,i is the forward exchange 
premium at t, for the period ending at (t+At), and the exchange rate i. The forward exchange 
premium is used as a measure o f interest rate differential. The inclusion of other 
contemporaneous exchange rates is tried to account for an interpretation o f the inter-war Gold 
Standard as a multilateral, rather than bilateral, system. The multilateral interpretation is 
consistent with the evidence that the September 1931 crisis also negatively affected the 
currencies that remained pegged to gold. Two systems of seemingly unrelated regressions 
(SUR), one for each forecasting horizon, are specified and estimated by FIML. This estimation 
method is more efficient than OLS regressions equation by equation, because it makes use also 
of the information contained in the high cross-correlations among the residuals o f the three 
equations for each forecasting horizon.
Devaluation expectations are then calculated by subtracting from the estimate o f Et[Ast]/At 
given by the forward premium the estimate o f Et[Axt]/At obtained from the SUR models. The 
resulting measure can be interpreted as the product o f the average frequency o f devaluation (i.e. 
the ratio o f the probability that a devaluation will occur within the forecasting horizon to the 
length of this forecasting horizon) and the expected devaluation size conditional on a 
devaluation occurring. A confidence interval for devaluation expectations can then be obtained 
by subtracting from the estimate o f Et[Ast]/At a confidence interval on the estimate of Et[Axt]/At. 
A change in the gold parity can be said to be expected with x% confidence if this x% confidence 
interval does not contain zero.
The width of the confidence interval depends on an estimate o f the standard deviation of 
the error term in the equation for Et[Axt]/At. If  the residuals o f this equation are homoskedastic, 
then the standard error o f the regression can be used to calculate the confidence interval. 
However, if these residuals are heteroskedastic, a time-varying measure o f their standard
(1.3)
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deviation is needed. In this study, the hypothesis that the residuals are ARCH is tested, and 
where it cannot be rejected, an estimate o f the time-varying standard deviation based on the 
ARCH model for the residual variance is used to calculate the confidence interval.
1.3.2. The Estimation Results
The data on spot and forward exchange rates are end-of-month quotations for the period 
January 1928-August 1931, based on Einzig (1937, Appendix I). The same source has been 
used by Hailwood et al. (1996, 1997). Moreover, the data later reported by Einzig had already 
been used by Demaria (1928), in his seminal study on the Italian lira forward exchange premia 
between 1921 and 1928.
As already indicated, Et[Ast]/At is measured by the forward exchange premium, with At 
equal to one month or three months.
The estimation results relative to equation (1.4) for the three exchange rates and the two 
forecasting horizons are presented in Table 1.1.
It can be seen that, on the one-month-ahead horizon, the only regressor that appears as 
statistically significant, or near to statistical significance, is xt, for all three exchange rates. On 
the three-month-ahead horizon also some o f the additional regressors become statistically 
significant. A Wald test o f the null hypothesis that all the coefficients o f the additional 
regressors included in equation (1.4) with respect to (1.3) are zero in all three equations is 
rejected on the longer but not on the shorter horizon.
For all three exchange rates and for both forecasting horizons, the series o f the point 
estimates of Et[Act]/At is calculated by subtracting from the forward exchange premium the 
point estimate of Et[Axt]/At obtained with the SUR systems.
For each exchange rate, at the one-month-ahead horizon, a 95% confidence interval for the 
estimated Et[Act]/At is determined using the standard error o f the relevant SUR equation and the 
5% critical value of a N(0,1) distribution. For each exchange rate, at the three-month-ahead 
horizon, an ARCH model for the variance of the error term is estimated and the 95% confidence 
interval calculated using the resulting estimate o f the time-varying standard deviation o f the 
error term and the 5% critical value o f a N(0,1) distribution. Table 1.2 presents the estimated 
ARCH models.
Figures 1.1 to 1.3 present the point estimates and the 95% confidence intervals for Et[Act]/ 
At for each of the three exchange rates on the three-month-ahead horizon. They consistently 
indicate that the financial markets were confident that the lira-gold parity would have been 
maintained only for the first few months after December 1927; that they started to doubt the 
sustainability of the parity from the late spring of 1928; and that they consistently expected a 
devaluation of the Italian currency in the following three months from late 1929. However, the
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expected change in the parity in the following month almost never became significantly 
different from zero.
The presence o f a target zone seems to have exerted a substantial stabilising effect on 
expectations in the first few months o f the lira gold peg, while later this effect became smaller 
and eventually negligible or even destabilising from late 1929. Furthermore, the larger size of 
the forward exchange premium at the longer horizon made the target zone effect on expectations 
more important in determining the expected change in the parity on the shorter horizon.
The result of significantly positive expectations o f a lira devaluation in the following three 
months from late 1929 depends on higher forward premia and less stabilising or even 
destabilising effects on expectations arising from the target zone.
In the next Section, the consistency o f these results with the documentary evidence is 
discussed.
1.3.3. Are the Estimation Results Consistent with the Documentary Evidence?
The econometric evidence that the very first months after the official gold peg in 
December 1927 were characterised by relative confidence in the lira-gold parity would appear 
to be consistent with the interpretation that the documentary and historiographic sources would 
support. Cotula and Spaventa (l 993, p. 154), for example, have written that “[a]t the beginning, 
the lira [held] the new parity well” . Furthermore, the Italian authorities considered their position 
strong enough to allow for three successive reductions by 0.5 per cent o f the discount rate in the 
spring 1928.
The interpretation based on the estimation results that the situation began to worsen after 
maybe four or five months also seems to be consistent with other sources of historical evidence.
It would seem possible to argue that the lira’s weakness may have been associated with a 
progressively strengthening awareness in the markets in the late spring 1928 that the French 
franc would have been soon pegged to gold at the de facto parity (see Sicsic, 1992, Moure, 
1991, pp. 4-5, Asselain and Plessis, 1995), as it actually happened on 25 June 1928.
The negative effect o f the official gold pegging o f the franc on the confidence in the lira 
was highlighted in the letter written by the Bank o f Italy’s Governor, Stringher, to Mussolini on 
12 July 1928 (published as doc. 210 in De Cecco, 1993).
At the same time, a second event reduced the confidence in the Italian currency: on 9 July 
1928, Mosconi became Finance Minister in place of Volpi. The New York Herald Tribune 
commented that Volpi had been dismissed because the Italian situation was disastrous: not only 
the gold parity was too high, but business failures and dishonoured bills were rapidly increasing, 
so that a deepening o f the political crisis was possible.
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The weakening of lira’s quotations led to violations o f the gold export point o f 19.10 lira to 
the dollar set by the government in February 1928,5 a circumstance that fuelled expectations 
that the lira-gold parity would have been abandoned (see, in particular, ASBI, Rapporti con 
1’Estero, cpl., n. 143 and 144; ASBI, Direttorio Stringher, cart. 27, fasc. 2; ASBI, Segreteria 
Particolare, pratt., n. 1, fasc. 2; doc. 211,212 and 215 in De Cecco, 1993).
At the same time, reserves were decreasing. Foreign currency reserves began to decrease 
as early as in March 1928, but gold reserve increases were more than compensatory, so that total 
reserves began to decrease only three months later. The decline continued until the end o f April 
1929.
The low confidence in the lira’s prospects persisted: in autumn 1928 Italian agents were 
reported buying in advance the foreign currencies they expected to need, because they feared 
that the trade balance deficit would have forced a lira devaluation (see ASBI, Rapporti con 
l’Estero, pratt., n. 20, fasc. 5).
The beginning o f 1929 did not bring any respite to the Italian authorities. The reserve 
losses continued to be o f great concern, not only in the eyes o f the Bank of Italy and the Italian 
government, but also in those o f the Bank of England (see ASBI, Rapporti con 1’Estero, cpl., n.
144). Stringher even tried (unsuccessfully) to negotiate a new loan (after the stabilisation one’s 
expiration) with Morgan’s Bank in April 1929 (see doc. 154, 155 and 156 in De Cecco, 1993).
The estimation results presented in the previous Section consistently indicate that the 
confidence in the lira experienced a sudden decline from autumn 1929. Despite the fact that 
such a pattern would seem to be not so clearly identifiable in the documentary and 
historiographic sources, these latter sources continue to supply evidence of a low confidence in 
the lira-gold peg after autumn 1929.
In the late 1929 documents, rumours that a speculative attack was to be launched on the 
lira and that the lira would have been devalued were reported. Among such documents, 
Mussolini’s letter to Stringher on 13 November 1929 can be mentioned. The dictator suggested 
that the rumours’ resurfacing could have been due to the tensions between Italy and France at 
the preliminary negotiations for the London Conference on the reduction o f naval weaponry 
(see doc. 135 in Cotula and Spaventa, 1993). The Italian authorities officially denied any plan to 
devalue the currency, but the rumours did not disappear.
In the British and US financial press the possibility o f a different source o f such rumours 
was suggested: the difficulties experienced by the Italian financial, industrial and business 
communities because o f the long lasting deflation and credit restrictions (see ASBI, Direttorio- 
Introna, cart. 23, fasc. 1).
5 The administratively set boundaries to the lira/dollar exchange rate fluctuations are not to be confused 
with the market determined gold points, which depended on gold transfer costs. However, the above 
mentioned estimates o f lira/dollar gold points contain the administratively set ones, 18.90 and 19.10.
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The existence o f a number of other documents suggesting the external origin of the low 
confidence in the lira (see ASBI, Rapporti con l’Estero, pratt., n. 26, fasc. 1) would seem to 
indicate that the domestic and the external problems may have been compounding their effects.
The Italian authorities seemed to be confident in their ability to defend the lira-gold parity 
when, on 12 March 1930, they abrogated the controls on foreign exchange transactions. This 
liberalisation was applauded by the international press (see ASBI, Direttorio Introna, cart. 23, 
fasc. 1). However, more negative comments on the Italian situation were to follow soon (see 
ASBI, Rapporti con l’Estero, pratt., n. 26, fasc. 1 and n. 66, fasc. 1). In particular, rumours that 
the Italian financial situation was so precarious to require a large external loan, and on the 
attendant secret negotiations taking place, continued to be reported in the foreign press 
throughout the late 1930, despite repeated official denials by the Italian authorities (see, for 
example, ASBI, Rapporti con l’Estero, pratt., n. 66, fasc. 1).
The only positive comments came after general cuts in wages and salaries in both the 
private and public sectors were decided in late November and early December 1930 (see the 
letter o f the Bank of Italy’s delegate in London to Stringher, on 29 November 1930, in ASBI, 
Rapporti con l’Estero, cpl., n. 145).
1931 began with the publication o f Moody’s Yearbook, where doubts on the stability o f the 
Fascist regime were expressed (see ASBI, Rapporti con l’Estero, pratt., n. 26, fasc. 3). Rumours 
on negotiations for a loan from France continued to be reported in the press, together with the 
official denials by the Italian authorities (see various documents in ASBI, Rapporti con 1’Estero, 
pratt., n. 26, fasc. 3 and in ASBI, Segreteria Particolare, pratt., n. 69, fasc. 2). Often, these 
rumours connected the alleged pattern o f negotiations for the loan with that o f the tensions 
between Italy and France on naval weaponry.
It would thus seem possible to argue that the documents suggest that there were reasons for 
a less than complete confidence in the lira-gold parity since (approximately) the official gold 
peg o f the French franc in late June 1928.
However, a rationalisation o f the econometric evidence that markets’ confidence in the lira 
fell in autumn 1929 could also be made by noting that an event such as the Wall Street crash, in 
addition to worsening confidence in the entire Gold Standard system in general, was also likely 
to affect more strongly those currencies already perceived as weak. Furthermore, it can be 
argued that the economic crisis that affected also the Italian economy from late 1929 increased 
the costs of defending a parity that had always been considered too high and therefore also 
increased the uncertainty about the Fascist regime’s willingness and capability o f maintaining 
its commitment to it.
In this regard, some more general considerations can also be made on the likely role played 
by the peculiar nature of the Italian political regime and the institutional arrangements 
concerning the Bank of Italy in determining the low level o f confidence of financial markets in
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the lira-gold parity. First, the Fascist government’s decision making was likely to be less 
transparent than those of democratic counterparts, a circumstance which could have made it 
harder for foreign observers to correctly weigh the relative importance of conflicting policy 
objectives. Second, the Bank of Italy was less independent from the government (notably, in 
setting the discount rate) than was the case for example for the Bank of England, an issue that 
had been considered at length during the negotiations leading up to the lira gold peg, in 
particular by Strong and Norman (see De Cecco, 1993, in particular pp. 64-83 o f the 
“Introduction” and the various documents mentioned therein). Third, the data officially 
published by the Italian authorities were not always considered to be fully reliable. See, for 
example, the various occasions in which the delegate of the Bank of Italy in New York, Podesta, 
signalled that some US newspapers warned their readers that the information on Italy was not 
reliable enough to allow a sound judgement to be formed (see, for example, ASBI, Direttorio 
Introna, cart. 23, fasc. 1).
Hence, it may have been that, when in late 1929 the economic crisis began in Italy, agents 
in the financial markets, aware o f the fact that the Fascist regime would have gone to any length 
to prevent news o f difficulties surfacing at the very moment when problems increased and 
uncertain about whether the crisis was diminishing the importance of the commitment to defend 
the gold peg with respect to increasingly conflicting policy objectives, began to give greater 
credence to rumours o f lira devaluation, disorders in some Italian cities, possible political 
instability, financial difficulties and consequent need for an external loan, and less importance 
to the official denials. The assumption that financial markets could be informed of the 
increasing economic difficulties in Italy, on which this argument relies, does not seem 
implausible given the evidence of detailed reports on the subject in the foreign press found in 
ASBI (see in particular the numerous and long quotations o f such reports in the foreign press in 
the memoranda periodically sent to Rome by the delegates o f the Bank of Italy abroad, in 
particular by those in London and in New York).
Moreover, the low degree o f autonomy of the Bank of Italy may have contributed to lower 
agents’ confidence in the lira during the economic crisis. Agents may have thought that in those 
hard circumstances the pressure from the government for violations o f the so-called rules o f the 
game would have been stronger, and the Bank of Italy did not have the independence needed to 
oppose such pressure.
These observations suggest that financial markets may have encountered peculiar 
difficulties in correctly interpreting the Italian situation. Hence they could give some insights 
into why discrepancies arose between markets expectations and actual outcomes, about not only 
the sustainability of the lira-gold parity, but also the stability o f the Fascist regime: while 
articles suggesting that the difficulties o f the Italian economic situation were so great as to 
justify the formulation of the expectation of an even violent political regime change appeared 
recurrently in the foreign press (see again the memoranda by the delegates o f the Bank of Italy
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in London and in New York, in ASBI), the Fascist regime was enjoying the years of its largest 
consensus (see De Felice, 1974).
It would seem interesting to contrast the discrepancy between expectations and the actual 
situation in the Italian lira case with that, in the opposite direction, during the last year of the 
gold peg o f the British pound. In this case, the Bank of England was able to prevent a 
substantial decrease o f financial markets’ confidence in the currency until July 1931, while the 
Bank itself (together with the British Treasury, the New York Federal Reserve Bank and the 
Bank o f France) had started being worried that a devaluation of the pound might become 
inevitable from the late 1930 (see Caimcross and Eichengreen, 1983, and Hailwood et al., 
1997). It would seem that the reputation of the Bank of England itself had a major role in 
facilitating this outcome. In particular, the Bank of England was able to persuade markets that it 
would have not deviated from the so-called rules o f the game (despite its record pointing to the 
contrary, see, e.g., the seminal study by Bloomfield, 1959) and to have them believe that the 
data on its balance sheet, published with the very purpose of misleading the markets, were 
instead a truthful representation o f the situation (see Sayers, 1976, and Garrett, 1995)! Hence 
the Bank o f England was able to concentrate agents’ attention on gold movements, rather than 
on the pound quotations, by repeating its commitment to the Gold Standard rules, by preventing 
gold exports when the pound was weak through dollar sales, and by publishing data showing 
gold reserves generally just above what was considered as the minimum safe level (i.e. 150 
million pounds, the value originally indicated by the Cunliffe Committee in 1918) even when 
they were much larger (see Moggridge, 1972, and Garrett, 1995).
Finally, another element that could have contributed in shaping agents expectations on the 
Italian lira after the autumn 1929 was the diplomatic tension with France on naval disarmament.
During the first seven years of the Fascist regime (1922-1929), there had been recurrent 
tensions between Italy and France, mainly due to the fact that Italy was knowingly creating 
difficulties to the French system of European hegemony, with the purpose o f becoming 
indispensable to French security. However, the relations between the two countries had been 
relatively calm in the first two years o f the lira gold peg. As already mentioned, the tension 
increased in the last months o f 1929, during the negotiations preceding the London Conference 
on naval disarmament. The contrast was mainly due to the difficulties that the Italian position 
caused to the French desire o f increasing its military power. The relations between the two 
countries remained difficult throughout the Conference (21 January-22 April 1930) and in the 
following months, until the one year moratorium on weapon production proposed by the Italian 
Foreign Affairs Minister, Grandi, was approved in September 1931 (for a detailed analysis of 
the Italian foreign policy in those years, see De Felice, 1974, Ch. IV).
It has been noted earlier that the rumours of Italy’s financial difficulties and its consequent 
need for an external loan were often related to the state o f its diplomatic relations with France.
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H ence, it w ould  seem that the existence o f  tensions betw een the tw o  countries m ay have played 
a ro le  in the w eakening o f  the confidence in the lira.
1.4. Determinants of Devaluation Expectations
In this Section, we complement the earlier econometric and documentary analysis by 
estimating an econometric model for the determinants of devaluation expectations. We do this 
by regressing the devaluation expectations obtained earlier using the Bertola and Svensson’s 
method on a set of possible explanatory variables, generally considered as relevant in standard 
models o f balance of payments and exchange rate determination (see MacDonald, 1988).
Such an analysis has been suggested, amongst others, by Bertola and Svensson (1993), 
Rose and Svensson (1991) and Svensson (1993). Lindberg et al. (1991) have conducted it for 
the Swedish Krona; Caramazza (1993) for the French franc/Deutschmark in the ERM; and Chen 
and Giovannini (1993) have estimated the determinants o f realignment expectations in the ERM 
together with the expectations themselves. Hailwood et al. (1996, 1997) have been the first to 
conduct a similar study for the classical and inter-war Gold Standards, but the set o f currencies 
they have considered does not include the Italian lira.
In this chapter, the following benchmark model for the determinants o f the Italian lira 
devaluation expectations is considered:
(1 5) E'^ AC' ^  = + ^ ^ ^  + (* " * '  ^  + ’ m' ^  +
+ (ca - c a * + p., (y - y * +  /?„dm2911 + e,
where: r is the growth rate of central bank’s reserves; n is the inflation rate; m is the growth rate 
of a monetary aggregate; ca is the logarithm of the exports over imports ratio (that is a measure 
of the increase in reserves due to the excess o f exports over imports); y is the growth rate of an 
output measure; indicates foreign variables; and dm2911 is a step-dummy variable, equal to 
zero until October 1929 and to one from November 1929 until the end of the sample. The one- 
period lag in the explanatory variables (apart from the dummy) is due to the fact that when 
forming their expectations on Ac in month t agents only had information on the explanatory 
variables up to month (t-1). The step dummy is included because there is evidence (confirmed 
by formal tests), that in November 1929 a once-and-for-all increase occurred in the mean of the 
estimated Et[Act]/At.
This model is deliberately very similar to those in Hailwood et al. (1996, 1997), so that any 
peculiarities o f the Italian case can be highlighted.
Generalisations o f the specification in equation (1.5) that could account for some 
peculiarities o f the Italian situation that may have had a bearing on the financial markets’ 
confidence in the lira-gold peg are also considered. In particular, the increasing immobilisation 
problems of the main Italian banks, due to worsening repayment prospects o f their loans as the
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depression hit Italian industry and the falling quotations o f the shares of companies in the 
industrial and service sectors held in large quantities in their portfolios (see Toniolo, 1980, Ch. 
5, and Toniolo, “II profilo economico”, in Guarino and Toniolo, 1993), have been considered. 
This illiquidity could have contributed to weaken the financial markets’ confidence in the lira- 
gold peg because it could have put the Italian authorities in a quandary similar to that 
experienced by the US Federal Reserve System (see, among the others, Eichengreen, 1992b, 
and Hailwood et al., 1997): on the one hand, to avoid bank runs it could have become necessary 
to rescue the illiquid banks by granting them easy credit access and thus expanding money 
supply more than the Gold Standard constraint would have allowed; on the other hand, if the 
authorities were expected to prefer bank failures to excessive money growth, capital flight could 
have ensued that in its turn would have undermined the capability o f the central bank to defend 
the currency.
The public seems to have had some knowledge o f the existence of immobilisation 
problems in the mixed banks’ balance sheets, even if not o f their full extent, due to the swift and 
secret way in which the rescues were carried out by the Italian authorities (see Toniolo, 1980, 
Ch. 5). The Bank o f Italy was able to continue to reduce banknote circulation despite the 
increased credit granted to the banks in difficulties, mainly because it decreased the credit to 
other banks (see Cotula and Spaventa, 1993).
To account for the banks’ immobilisation problems, the rates o f change o f bankruptcies, 
protests and two stock market indices (a general one and one relative to banks’ shares only) 
have also been considered as possible regressors in the equation for the determinants of 
devaluation expectations. Bankruptcies and protests have been included as measures o f the 
difficulties experienced by the companies financed by the banks and hence as proxies for the 
decreasing probability o f repayment o f banks’ loans. The general stock market index has been 
included as an indicator of the problems that banks experienced due to the decline in the values 
of their portfolios of shares; the banks’ stock market index because banks’ financial difficulties 
may have been compounded by decreasing quotations o f their shares.
The fact that the Italian stock market quotations could not be considered as very 
representative o f the actual values and prospects o f the quoted companies would seem not to 
undermine the rationale behind the inclusion o f the two stock market indices’ growth rates: 
when the prices o f their shares or of shares in their portfolios fell, the banks’ balance sheets 
weakened, no matter how much stock market prices were representative o f the prospects of 
industrial or service companies or of the banks’ themselves.
Equation (1.5) is considered as the benchmark model o f devaluation expectations 
for each of our three lira exchange rates and at both forecasting horizons. The three 
equations for each of the forecasting horizons are jointly estimated by seemingly 
unrelated regressions (SUR). The standard errors are calculated via White’s (1980)
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formula, hence they are consistent with respect to heteroskedasticity, but not 
autocorrelation. The sources and construction methods o f the data set used in the 
estimations are described in Appendix A.2.
The estimation results are presented in Table 1.3.
The dummy variable appears as by far the most significant regressor in all six equations. 
Almost the only other significant regressor is the rate o f change o f reserves, for all the equations 
with the exception o f that for the lira/dollar rate on the three-month-ahead horizon. In all the 
other five cases the estimated effect o f a reserve growth larger in Italy than in the other country 
on the confidence in the lira-gold parity is positive (i.e. it decreases the expected devaluation of 
the lira, Et[Act]/At), consistent with what economic theory would suggest.
Figures 1.4 to 1.6 present the actual and fitted values for the three equations for the three- 
month-ahead horizon (the corresponding graphs for the one-month ahead horizon are very 
similar). They show that the break in the mean of the estimated Et[Act]/At is well captured by 
the dummy variable. Furthermore, the endogenous variable pattern seems to be better 
approximated during the first part o f the sample period, ending in late 1929, than afterwards. 
Therefore it would seem possible to argue that the role o f macroeconomic variables in the 
expectations’ formation is small in the entire sample period (the most significant regressor is in 
fact a dummy variable), and even more so from late 1929 onwards.
The case o f the Italian lira would seem peculiar with respect to those studied by Hailwood 
et al. (1996, 1997), because a substantial and long lasting confidence loss would appear to have 
taken place from late 1929, that does not seem to be explained by the paths of the 
macroeconomic variables included as regressors in the estimated equations. However, agents in 
the financial markets seem to have continued to hold such expectations, despite no devaluation 
occurring.
These features appear different from those of the cases examined by Hailwood et al. (1996,
1997), where either there were expectations o f devaluation based on macroeconomic variables 
and preceding an actual crisis (see the pound case), or expectations became significantly 
different from zero for few months and then reverted to be non significantly different from zero 
(see the French franc and reichsmark cases, for which, on the basis o f the information contained 
in the 1996 paper, it is difficult to judge whether the emergence o f brief periods o f low 
confidence was explained by macroeconomic variables’ paths).
Hence, the estimation results described so far would not seem to contradict the 
interpretation o f the evidence of significant devaluation expectations given at the end of Section 
1.3. In particular, they would seem to be consistent with the argument that agents did not trust 
the macroeconomic data published by the Italian authorities sufficiently to base on them their 
expectations on the lira-gold parity, particularly from the onset of the economic crisis.
As a test of the robustness o f this conclusion, we estimate a generalisation o f equation (1.5) 
including among the regressors also the four variables mentioned above (bankruptcies, protests,
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and the two stock market indices) and intended as indicators of immobilisation problems in the 
banking sector:
( 1.6)
E,[Ac,]/At = /3„ + /?,(r - r‘ ),.| + & ( * - * ' ) , . ,  + /?3(m -m *)t., + /?4(ca -ca ’ ),., +
+ A (y -y ') .- i  + /?„bnkrpt,_i + /?7prtstw +/?8gensmw + /?9bnksm,.l + /?](ldm2911 + 
where bnkrpt, prtst, gensm and bnksm are the rates o f change in, respectively, bankruptcies, 
protests, the general and the banking sector nominal stock market indices.
The estimation results obtained for the SUR systems for the two forecasting horizons are 
presented in Table 1.4. The results for the three lira exchange rates appear more differentiated 
than those for equation (1.5), but the dummy variable remains the most important regressor in 
all six cases. For the lira/dollar exchange rate on the three-month-ahead horizon an additional 
regressor, the rate o f change in the general stock market index, appears as significant and with 
the expected sign (a more rapid increase in the index strengthens the confidence in the lira, 
arguably via its positive effects on banks’ balance sheets). For the lira/pound rate, not only the 
same index, but also the rate of change in protests appears as additional significant regressor 
with respect to equation (1.5). However, this second variable shows an unexpected sign (a more 
rapid increase in protests would appear to strengthen the confidence in the lira). Finally, only 
the dummy variable appears to have significantly affected the lira/French franc rates in these 
estimates. The standard errors o f the regressions decrease for the lira/dollar rate on the three- 
month-ahead horizon, and for the lira/pound rate on both horizons.
Figures 1.7 to 1.9 present the actual and fitted values for the three-month-ahead horizon 
equations. As expected from the analysis o f the estimated regressions, the fitted values pattern is 
nearer to that o f the estimated Et[Act]/At for the lira/dollar and lira/pound exchange rates, but 
not for the lira/French franc one. However, in both the lira/dollar and lira/French franc cases the 
fitted values seem to be more similar to the estimated Et[Act]/At in the first sub-period, ending in 
October 1929, than afterwards. This evidence is therefore still consistent with the hypothesis 
that the Italian situation became more difficult to interpret for the financial markets after the 
onset o f the economic crisis, when agents may have started to rely less than before on 
macroeconomic variables for their expectation formation.
Therefore, the analysis o f the determinants o f the estimated devaluation expectations 
would seem to support the assertion that the conviction that the lira-gold parity was 
unsustainable, held by the markets from late 1929 onwards, was mainly based on factors 
different from macroeconomic variables: these variables cannot explain the sudden increase in 
the mean of the estimated Et[Act]/At; furthermore, at least in two out o f the three considered 
cases, they seem to be less capable to explain the pattern of estimated Et[Act]/At in the second
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sub-period. In this sense the analysis in this Section does not contradict the conclusions drawn 
at the end of Section 1.3.
This peculiarly small role o f macroeconomic variables in determining expectations on the 
exchange rate may be related to a less than full reliance o f agents in the financial markets on the 
data published by the Italian authorities. Hence, these agents had to use other types of 
information. The analysis of the contemporary documents presented in Section 1.3 would seem 
to suggest that they may have been driven by rumours o f negotiations o f a foreign loan (hinting 
at a financial situation more precarious than that described by the official data), diplomatic 
tensions (that, if leading to a military confrontation, may have forced the Fascist government to 
sacrifice the lira-gold peg), or political instability, disorders and even the possibility o f a violent 
regime change (that could have implied the abandonment o f the Fascist commitment to defend 
the lira-gold peg). All these factors may have played a stronger role after the onset o f the 
economic crisis, as argued in Section 1.3.
On the other hand, if the data published by the Italian authorities are to be considered as 
reliable, they may explain why the Fascist government was able to maintain the lira-gold peg 
and why this result was achieved without any substantial consensus loss for the Fascist regime: 
these data do not indicate that the main macroeconomic variables deviated enough from the 
paths consistent with the gold peg constraint to support the opinion that the lira-gold parity 
became unsustainable from late 1929.
It would seem that the results described in this Section for the estimation o f a model for 
devaluation expectations are consistent with the interpretation o f the expectations’ worsening 
based on the difficulties experienced by financial markets’ agents in correctly assessing the 
Italian situation, due to the peculiarities o f the country’s political and institutional framework 
(namely its dictatorial regime, the low level o f transparency in decision making, the censorship, 
and the limited autonomy from the government o f the Bank of Italy), presented at the end of 
Section 1.3.
1.5. Conclusions
We have studied the participation of the Italian lira in the inter-war Gold Standard, 
focusing on the sustainability o f its gold parity in the eyes o f financial markets’ agents and the 
possible determinants of agents’ expectations.
The possibility o f interpreting the lira exchange rate regime during its gold pegging as a 
target zone has been explored, in particular on the basis o f new estimates of the gold points with 
respect to the US dollar, the UK pound and the French franc, and by examining their violations. 
The conclusion that the lira exchange rate regime was a target zone between the lira gold
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pegging on 21 December 1927 and the abandonment o f the gold peg by the pound on 21 
September 1931 has been reached.
We have then applied Bertola and Svensson’s (1993) method to estimate expected parity 
changes in the context o f a target zone to the lira exchange rates with respect to the dollar, the 
pound and the French franc. The estimation results have indicated that on the whole markets 
were confident that the lira would have remained pegged to gold at the December 1927 parity 
until autumn 1929, but that they expected a devaluation afterwards. This development was due 
to higher forward premia and less stabilising or even destabilising effects on expectations 
arising from the target zone. These econometric results seem to be broadly consistent with the 
evidence contained in contemporary documents.
The estimated devaluation expectations have then been regressed on a set of 
macroeconomic variables including those generally considered as relevant in models of 
exchange rate and balance o f payments determination and some representing the increasing 
immobilisation problems o f Italian banks. It has been found that the estimated substantial loss of 
confidence from late 1929 can be replicated only via the inclusion among the regressors o f a 
step-dummy variable equal to one from November 1929 onwards: not only the macroeconomic 
variables cannot account for it, but their capability to explain the fluctuations o f the estimated 
Et[Act]/At appears to be smaller in the second sub-period.
These results seem consistent with an interpretation of the worsening o f the confidence in 
the lira-gold parity in late 1929 based on the argument that the peculiar nature o f the Fascist 
regime made the Italian economic situation, and thus also the sustainability o f the lira-gold peg, 
peculiarly difficult to understand for the financial markets. It would seem that the dictatorial 
nature of the Fascist regime, the low level of transparency in its decision making, the censorship 
that it exerted, its consequences on the institutional setting (in particular the fact that the Bank 
of Italy was not independent from the government) may have played a role in diminishing the 
reliability of the macroeconomic data published by the Italian authorities and the credibility of 
their commitment to the gold peg in the eyes o f the financial markets. They may have then 
given more importance when forming their expectations to rumours o f financial and political 
instability that they would have been more ready to disregard had the Italian political regime 
been a democratic one. This is more likely to have happened after the economic crisis started 
also in Italy, when the incentives for the Fascist regime not only to depict the situation as rosier 
than it was but also to abandon the gold peg increased.
Furthermore, this interpretation would seem to shed some light on why the government 
was able to honour its commitment to maintain the lira-gold peg: if the published 
macroeconomic data are to be considered reliable, they do not indicate that from the late 1929 
onwards the main macroeconomic variables deviated enough from the paths consistent with the 
gold peg constraint to support the opinion that the lira-gold parity had become unsustainable.
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Std.Error 0.00112961 0.00037426 0.0013154
3
0.00050146 0.00188372 0.00082612
Table 1.2: Estimates of ARCH Models
lira/dollar (At=3) Lira/pound (At=3) lira/F.franc (At=3)









Constant 4.699e-008 1.571e-007 4.305e-007
(1.1439) (2.2003) (2.7075)




SE 1.9943e-007 3.81207e-007 7.49954e-007
NOTES:
In each case, the order o f the estimated ARCH process has been chosen as that at which the strongest 
evidence o f ARCH was found, with a test o f the null hypothesis o f ARCH(O) against the alternative of 
ARCH(p).
The probabilities that the distributions of the test statistics under the null hypothesis take a value larger 
than the sample ones are indicated in square brackets. The estimated coefficients are presented together 
with their t-values (in parenthesis).
The relative weakness of the ARCH effects is known to be common on monthly data.
Table 1.3: Determinants o f Devaluation Expectations: SUR Estimates o f the Specification in Equation 

































































































Std.Error 0.00056405 0.00099743 0.00036092 0.00082736 0.00043963 0.00077697
N 38 36 38 36 38 36
28
Table 1.4: Determinants of Devaluation Expectations: SUR Estimates of the Specification in Equation 

















































































































































Std.Error 0.00056352 0.00093571 0.00033694 0.00075966 0.00044407 0.00077498
N 38 36 38 36 38 36











Figure 1.2: lira/UK pound: point estimate and 95% confidence interval for
E[dc]/dt 
(dt- 3 months)
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Figure 1.4: Italian Lira/US Dollar Exchange Rate: Three-Month-Ahead Estimated Devaluation 
Expectations and Fitted Values from Equation (5)
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Figure 1.5: Italian Lira/UK Pound Exchange Rate: Three-Month-Ahead Estimated Devaluation
Expectations and Fitted Values from Equation (5)
Figure 1.6: Italian Lira/French Franc Exchange Rate: Three-Month-Ahead Estimated Devaluation 
Expectations and Fitted Values from Equation (5)
1929 1930 1931 1932
Figure 1.7: Italian Lira/US Dollar Exchange Rate: Three-Month-Ahead Estimated Devaluation 
Expectations and Fitted Values from Equation (6)
1930 1931 1932
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Figure 1.8: Italian Lira/UK Pound Exchange Rate: Three-Month-Ahead Estimated Devaluation
Expectations and Fitted Values from Equation (6)
Figure 1.9: Italian Lira/French Franc Exchange Rate: Three-Month-Ahead Estimated Devaluation 
Expectations and Fitted Values from Equation (6)
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Chapter 2
THE ITALIAN INDUSTRIAL LABOUR MARKET DURING THE INTER-WAR 
CRISIS: WERE WAGES FLEXIBLE ENOUGH?
2.1. Introduction
In the last fifteen years, the literature on the causes o f unemployment during the economic 
crisis which started at the end o f the 1920s has been enriched by the use of labour market 
models based on assumptions o f imperfect competition in the goods and labour markets, such as 
those used to describe the post-war British economy by Layard an Nickell (1985, 1986). This 
literature has considered again in particular the British case (see Dimsdale, 1984, Dimsdale, 
Nickell and Horsewood, 1989, Beenstock and Warburton, 1986 and 1991, and Turner and 
Bowden, 1995, but also, for example, Dimsdale and Horsewood, 2002, on Australia).
The Italian labour market between the wars has however so far not been investigated with 
these models.
The only study where labour demand functions for the Italian industries in that period have 
been estimated is that by Toniolo and Piva (1988), where a first attempt to consider the effects 
of both real wages and demand factors on employment has been made. Their results have 
supplied more evidence in support o f a classical rather than a Keynesian unemployment 
interpretation, but have been commented by their authors with the suggestion that the wage 
level that could have cleared the labour market could have been so low as to be politically 
unacceptable. However, their model does not include variables (such as world and domestic 
demand conditions, and prices of a further variable production factor) which could have had an 
important effect on labour demand. Furthermore, it would seem that these authors have failed to 
consider the possibility that some o f the regressors in their equations may have been 
endogenous, a circumstance which, if verified, may have made their coefficient estimates 
inconsistent.
Furthermore, Mattesini and Quintieri (1997) have considered the issue o f whether 
industrial wages were flexible enough to prevent deflation from having depressive effects on 
output in their study o f the Italian economy between 1929 and 1936, and found evidence for the 
contrary. However, it would seem that their result has been obtained using either a cost o f living 
index or a general wholesale price one as wage deflator. Hence, there would seem to be some 
scope for doubting that their real labour costs measure was accurate.
Finally, Perri and Quadrini (2002) studied the possibility to replicate the fall in Italian GDP 
within the context o f a two-sector (tradable and non tradable products) open economy lifetime 
utility maximisation model for the Italian non farm sector. They found that fixed hourly real 
wages could explain one fourth o f the decline between 1929 and 1932. They chose to focus on 
the entire non farm sector and on the distinction between tradable and non tradable products,
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hence they did not distinguish within the manufacturing sector between industries more exposed 
to the international competition and those more sheltered from it. Furthermore, they did not 
allow for degrees o f imperfect competition in any market.
In this chapter, after a description o f the Italian industrial labour market on the basis o f the 
existing literature (Section 2.2), the relevance o f the choice o f a deflator for nominal wages is 
studied in the context of a preliminary analysis o f the issue o f wage flexibility, which also 
distinguishes between industries more exposed to international competition and those more 
sheltered from it (Section 2.3). This investigation is continued by a comparison o f actual wages 
with those which could have been feasible, on the basis o f a measure o f the trend productivity 
increase (Section 2.4). A model of labour demand based on an assumption o f imperfect 
competition in the goods market but not in the labour one is then derived (Section 2.5), 
specified and estimated for industries exposed to international competition and those sheltered 
from it (Section 2.6), and its implications for wages and labour allocation between industrial 
sectors are drawn (Section 2.7). Section 2.8 concludes the chapter.
2.2. A Description of the Italian Industrial Labour Market in the Inter-War 
Years on the Basis of the Existing Literature
This chapter focuses on the industrial section o f the Italian labour market in the inter-war 
crisis. This is the sector of the economy for which there is a relatively good data availability. Its 
labour force stayed around one fourth o f the total for the entire inter-war period.
A number o f its characteristics can be identified on the basis o f the existing literature.
The labour supply was very elastic, due to the widespread underemployment in agriculture, 
(with the crisis) the large unemployment, and the significant mobility o f the labour force 
(testified by the movements out o f agricultural employment and into industrial employment at 
times o f industrial expansion and backwards at times o f industrial crisis; and by labour 
migration both outside and within the country, despite the attempts by the regime to discourage 
workers from leaving the countryside) (Toniolo and Piva, 1988).
Both skilled (industrial) and unskilled (not just industrial) workers appear to have been 
subject to rapid turnover, and long spells of unemployment, or employment in low paid, less- 
skilled jobs. Both in agriculture and in manufacturing few workers were employed during an 
entire year or over a long span o f years (these remarks are based on the evidence described in a 
limited number of studies on individual firms, and an industrial district, as reported by Toniolo 
and Piva, 1988). Hence it would seem that it was relatively easy for employers to hire and fire 
workers. However, at least from April 1926, workers had very little chances of being hired if 
not holders o f a Fascist union membership card. This requirement somehow limited the 
effective labour supply.
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Workers could receive unemployment benefits only if  previously continuously employed 
for at least 48 weeks; payment o f benefits lasted up to 90 days (or up to 120, if previous 
continuous employment had lasted at least 72 weeks). Monthly unemployment benefits reached 
the equivalent of 5-6 days’ pay; for a full year, an unemployed worker would receive a sum 
equivalent, at best, to 18 to 20 days’ pay (Musso, 1981). The number of people benefiting from 
them could not have exceeded 625,500 in 1932 (i.e. 55% of registered unemployed workers). 
These data are at the basis o f Toniolo and Piva’s (1988) affirmation that such benefits could not 
induce any unemployment.
The structure o f the labour market during the inter-war crisis years was the result also of 
the institutional changes which took place in the first few years o f the Fascist regime. It is worth 
mentioning in particular the Palazzo Chigi Pact (December 1923), that favoured a strong and 
privileged cooperation between the Fascist trade unions and the confederation o f the 
industrialists, and the Palazzo Vidoni Pact (October 1925), that banned the non Fascist trade 
unions thus officially granting the monopoly to the Fascist one (see, e.g., Toniolo, 1980, Ch. 2).
After these pacts, wages were set, together with working hours, disciplinary sanctions, etc., 
in agreements between officials o f the employers’ organisation and Fascist union, at the 
provincial or national level. Then the agreements had to be approved first by the governing 
boards o f the employers’ and workers’ confederations and finally by a (provincial or national) 
government authority (see, e.g., Salvemini, 1936). The government intervened directly in the 
negotiations if the parties could not reach an agreement on their own (see, e.g., Salvemini, 1936, 
and De Felice, 1974, Ch. 2).
It would not seem that, in general, the contracts for all sectors were bargained and signed 
simultaneously (see, e.g., De Felice, 1974, Ch. 2). However, the government could decide 
general cuts in all wages and salaries, as it did in three occasions: November 1927, November 
1930 and April 1934 (in January 1933 a tax reform was enacted which in fact meant another 
general wage cut).
The high degrees o f coordination and inflexibility that seem to have been induced by the 
just described procedure were actually reduced by the large discretionary powers that employers 
could enjoy, in fact if not by law. The single employers were able to autonomously reduce 
wages, even below the minimum ones set in the collective contracts. Sometimes this was 
brought about by an increase in the number of working hours but not in the weekly wage. 
Furthermore, employers could reduce their wage bills by moving a worker to a job only 
formally less demanding, or by substituting less experienced and hence less paid workers for 
more experienced and hence more paid ones (see, e.g., De Felice, 1968, Ch. 3, and 1974, Ch. 2, 
and Mortara, 1978).
The opinions expressed on the Italian industrial labour market by the scholars who have 
studied it differ deeply.
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The Fascist unions, for example, have been considered by Salvemini (1936) as organs of 
the Fascist regime, rather than democratic organisations aimed at representing and defending 
workers’ interests. Furthermore, he has stressed how workers were not effectively protected 
from contracts’ violations by the employers.
These unions have been characterised as one o f the instruments through which consensus 
for the regime was organised even by De Felice (1974, Ch. 3). However, he has qualified this 
statement arguing that, within the constraints of the dictatorship, the unions carried on a role 
somehow useful for workers, and that the protection of workers’ rights in the Labour Courts 
was effective.
This last assessment has been disputed by Castronovo (1975), who has underlined the 
considerable length of the processes in these Courts. Moreover, he has argued that the Fascist 
unions lacked any effective bargaining and political powers, a circumstance which allowed the 
government to implement a stem policy o f wage cuts. These measures, according to the author, 
contributed to decrease the impact o f the crisis on the Italian economy while making the 
workers endure it.
The regime’s wage policy has been an object o f analysis also in Toniolo (1980), who has 
pointed out how it was forced to mediate between ‘law and order’ requirements and those of 
industrial efficiency, and has argued that it did not succeed in achieving either the target of 
effectively sustaining employment (pursued by reducing the number of worked hours per 
employee) or the increase in productivity. Furthermore, it inevitably discriminated between 
workers o f ‘protected’ sectors and those o f sectors (such as textiles) to which no high priority 
was assigned. Toniolo has concluded that with the crisis part of the Italian industry proceeded 
towards autarchy, helped and supported by the state, while the sectors producing non durable or 
export goods, in order to survive, had to rely on ever lower wages and ever faster working rates 
(p. 175).
2.3. Nominal and Real Factory Workers’ Wages: A Preliminary Data 
Analysis
The richest source o f data on the Italian industrial labour market in the inter-war years is 
the series o f surveys conducted initially every month and then every two months by the 
confederation o f industrialists (then called Confederazione Generale Fascista dell’Industria 
Italiana) from 1928 onwards, and published in ASSONIME, Bollettino di notizie economiche, 
Rome, various issues, and in ISTAT, Bollettino mensile di statistica, Rome, various issues. This 
source contains monthly data on the number o f employed factory workers, the total number of 
hours worked by these employees, the total amount of wages paid to them, and also data, 
obtained from the just mentioned ones, on the average hourly wage and the average number of 
hours worked monthly by each employee. These data refer to a sample o f firms including
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between 16 and 24 per cent o f those belonging to the industrialists’ confederation, and 
employing more than 50 per cent o f registered factory workers. As observed by Zamagni 
(1994), these enterprises, being the largest, were also likely to pay the highest wages. The data 
were presented not only in an aggregated form, but also segmented by industry, and by region.
The sample of firms changed each time the surveys were conducted (due to the entry in 
and exit from the market of some of them at any time). However, each time the data were also 
collected again for the last month covered by the previous survey on the new firms’ sample. 
This meant that there was an observation on two different samples every month or two months, 
a fact which could be used to obtain time series, e.g. o f the average nominal hourly wage of 
factory workers.
Zamagni (1994) has employed a method suggested by Barbieri (1938), and afterwards 
widely used, to solve the problem of the time-varying sample. Barbieri described this method as 
based on simple averages o f the double observations (that is o f the two observations o f a certain 
variable for a certain month obtained on two different samples in two successive surveys) when 
they were very similar, and on proportional adjustments when they were more far apart. He said 
to have chosen it because it should allow to obtain time series similar to the survey 
observations’ averages. This did not happen with the method previously employed by ISTAT, 
based on proportional adjustments starting from the two observations for March 1928, which 
were unusually far apart.
However, if the series o f average nominal hourly industrial wages obtained by Barbieri 
(see Table IV in his paper) is compared with the raw data o f the confederation o f industrialists’ 
surveys, it seems that his criterion for choosing between averaging or proportionally adjusting 
the double observations is very subjective, and that some o f the data o f Barbieri’s series cannot 
be replicated with either o f these techniques.
Furthermore, as already noted by Barbieri on a longer sample period (February 1928- 
December 1937, see Table II in his paper) than the one considered here (April 1928-August 
1935), the largest part o f the double observations are very similar.
Table 2.1 shows that this is true also on the shorter sample period considered here, and not 
only for the aggregate industrial sector, but also for the two subsectors (more precisely defined 
in the following) o f the industries exposed to international competition and o f those sheltered 
from it.6
The drawbacks of Barbieri’s series and the very small discrepancies between double 
observations support the method followed here to obtain time series from the confederation o f 
industrialists’ surveys. This method consists in averaging double observations and not 
modifying the single ones.
6 From Table 2.1, 75% o f the aggregate industrial sector discrepancies are between 0.00 and 0.02 Italian 
lira; for the exposed sectors, almost 73% o f the discrepancies are no larger than 0.03 lira, and 81% no 
larger than 0.04 lira; for the sheltered sectors, 77% of the discrepancies are no larger than 0.03 lira, and 
almost 90% are no larger than 0.04 lira.
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However, the so obtained series for nominal hourly wages o f factory workers is very 
similar to that published by Zamagni (1994), as it can be seen in Figure 2.1. The same 
observation could be made also for nominal monthly wages.
The first thing that can be noted is that the decrease in nominal hourly wages o f factory 
workers was not large enough to prevent an increase in real hourly wages. As it can be seen in 
Figure 2.2, both the workers’ purchasing power (i.e. the wage divided by the cost o f living 
index calculated by ISTAT, Bollettino mensile di statistica, Rome, various issues) and a first 
approximation of the real cost o f labour (i.e. the wage divided by the general wholesale price 
index in Tav. A. 15 in Cotula and Spaventa, 1993) increased from 1929. The greater fall in 
wholesale than in retail prices implied a larger increase in this measure o f the real costs born by 
the employers than in the workers’ purchasing power.
A similar nominal rigidity can be observed also in monthly real wages, in particular when 
they are calculated as real labour costs, as shown in Figure 2.3.
In the following, the attention is focused on hourly wages, as they seem to supply a more 
adequate measure of labour costs for the employers.
To obtain more accurate measures o f real hourly labour costs, other price indices are 
considered. In particular, to avoid deflating industrial wages with price indices including 
agricultural products, two measures of manufactured goods wholesale price indices are used, 
together with an index o f prices o f exports of manufactured goods. The index denoted 
(CPEMI)manufWPI is an index o f wholesale prices o f finished goods, calculated by the 
Provincial Economic Council in Milan and based on the prices o f 12 goods observed in Milan. 
The index denoted (Bachi)manufWPI is an index o f wholesale prices o f finished goods 
calculated by Bachi, and based on the prices o f 18 to 21 goods observed in Milan, Genoa, Turin 
and Rome. Both these indices were published in ISTAT, Bollettino mensile di statistica, Rome, 
various issues, until December 1934. Finally, the index denoted manufexP is an index o f prices 
of exports of manufactured goods, calculated by the confederation o f industrialists and 
published in the same bulletin, starting from 1926. It is based on the prices of 206 goods, 
representing no less than 90 per cent of the exports o f manufactured goods.
Figure 2.4 shows the measures o f real wages obtained with these deflators. The index 
calculated by the Provincial Economic Council in Milan for finished goods behaved very 
similarly to the general wholesale price index: with both o f them real labour costs are measured 
to have increased by around 50 per cent, thus seeming to indicate that nominal industrial wages 
were somehow insufficiently flexible. However, the index calculated by Bachi does not support 
this conclusion: it leads to a measure of real labour costs which increases by only around 15 per 
cent, hence by a percentage which could be not too dissimilar from the productivity rise. 
Finally, it is clear that real labour costs in the exporting sectors increased significantly: the ratio 
o f hourly wages over the index of prices of exports of manufactured goods rose by more than 
100 per cent.
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Bachi index seems to be more reliable than the Provincial Economic Council o f Milan one, 
for two main reasons. The first is that it was based on a larger number o f goods, and that their 
prices were observed in all the main industrial cities, rather than just in one. The second is that it 
would seem quite unlikely that, at a time when prices o f agricultural goods decreased 
significantly with respect to those of manufactured ones (see e.g. Toniolo, 1980), an index of 
wholesale prices excluding agricultural goods could behave very similarly to one including 
them. Therefore, it would seem possible to conclude that, if the entire industrial sector is 
considered, nominal wages are likely to have been flexible enough to prevent employers from 
having to face significant increases in real labour costs.
However, the very large rise in the ratio o f hourly wages over prices o f exports of 
manufactured goods seems to indicate that a significant problem o f increasing real labour costs 
may have existed in the exporting sectors.
To explore this issue, the industrial sector has been divided in two subsectors, one made by 
the industries which were more exposed to international competition, and the other by the 
industries which were more sheltered from it. The possible relevance o f this partition has 
already been highlighted by Toniolo (1980), as mentioned at the end of the previous Section.
As already indicated, the confederation o f industrialists’ surveys supplied not only 
aggregate data for the entire industrial sector, but also a disaggregation of these data for ten 
industrial subsectors: agricultural and food industry; extractive industry and quarries; 
construction industry; construction materials industry; mechanical and metallurgical industry; 
textile and clothing industry; chemical and related industry; paper and printing industry; wood 
industry; utilities.7
These are the industries that are aggregated into the two subsectors, one more exposed to 
international competition and one more sheltered from it.
To identify these two subsectors, the opinions expressed in the existing literature on the 
Italian industry at the time and the extent to which it was protected have been considered, in 
particular those contained in Tattara and Toniolo (1976), Paradisi (1976), Tattara (1980), 
Toniolo (1980) and Federico and Tena (1998, 1999). It should be noted that the concept of 
protection on which the following classification has been based is a broad one, including 
various forms o f government intervention in favour o f a certain industry, the most important of 
which were not only custom duties, but also its active support o f syndicates and resource 
transfers.
On the basis of this information, the subsector o f industries exposed to international 
competition is identified as made by agricultural and food industries, extractive industry and 
quarries, textile and clothing industry, and wood industry. Hence the subsector o f sheltered
7 Data were also supplied for an eleventh aggregate, called various industries, o f all the firms not included 
in the previous ten. However, the smaller and more fluctuating percentages o f firms surveyed (and hence 
o f their employees) with respect to the existing ones for this last aggregate than for the other ten has 
suggested to exclude it from the analysis.
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industries includes construction industry, construction materials industry, mechanical and 
metallurgical industry, chemical and related industry, paper and printing industry, and utilities.
The percentage of factory workers recorded in the confederation o f industrialists’ surveys 
as employed in the subsector of industries exposed to international competition decreased from 
around 53 in 1928 to around 47 in 1934. The percentage o f worked hours for the same subsector 
of industries declined similarly, from around 52 in 1928-1929 to around 45 in 1934-1935.
In the following the data on nominal and real hourly wages o f factory workers in the two 
industrial subsectors are analysed.
As it can be seen in Figure 2.5, the average nominal hourly wage of factory workers in the 
exposed sectors was always lower than that in the sheltered sectors by around 0.70 Italian lira. 
Wages in both industrial subsectors decreased by around 0.40 lira between early 1928 and early 
1935, an amount which corresponds to 22 per cent o f the initial wage in the exposed sectors, but 
to only 16 per cent o f the initial wage in sheltered ones.
The measure o f real labour costs in the exposed industries obtained by deflating nominal 
wages by the above described index of prices of manufactured goods’ exports shows a 150 per 
cent increase in the considered period (see Figure 2.6).
However, if exposed or sheltered sectors’ wages are deflated by the above described 
wholesale price indices o f manufactured goods results very similar to those for the whole 
industrial sector are obtained, as it can be observed by comparing Figures 2.4, 2.7 and 2.8.
The main conclusion that can be drawn from this preliminary data analysis is therefore that 
nominal wage decreases were large enough to prevent a significant rise in real labour costs in 
the sheltered industries, but not in the exposed ones, which were affected by much larger falls in 
their output prices.
Until now the attention has been mainly focused on measures of hourly real labour costs. 
However to understand why the government did not intervene to prevent the increases in these 
costs which occurred at least in the exposed sectors it can be useful to consider more carefully 
workers’ purchasing power.
As it can be seen also comparing Figures 2.2 and 2.3, the hourly measure o f real wages 
that can be obtained if wages are deflated by a cost of living index and annual averages are 
considered increases by 12 per cent between 1929 and 1934, while the corresponding monthly 
measure rises by only 6 per cent, due to contemporaneous fall in the number o f hours worked 
monthly.
However, monthly real wages during these years were up to 18 per cent lower than in the 
first half o f the 1920s (see Table 8, p. 368, in Zamagni, 1994).
Furthermore, if daily real wages are considered, they can be observed to have been below 
what Zamagni (1976) has called a minimum subsistence level which was considered as 
‘acquired’, identified at 15 1938 lira, between 1928 and 1932, temporarily just above this level
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in 1933 and 1934 (respectively at 15.18 and 15.26 1938 lira), but then again below it between 
1935 and 1939 (see Tables 3 and 4, pp. 339 and 342, in Zamagni 1976). Also according to this 
measure workers’ purchasing power was lower in the period 1929-1934 than in the previous 
years: the real daily wage had been between 15.84 and 17.34 1938 lira in the years 1920-1927 
(see Tables 2 and 3, pp. 331 and 339, in Zamagni, 1976).
Furthermore, the idea that living standards o f factory workers worsened from the late 
1920s until at least the mid-1930s is consistent with the evidence on per capita private 
consumption, whose levels declined in these years (see Table 9, p. 349, in Zamagni, 1976).
Finally, it is worth noting that this evidence means that in the considered period workers’ 
purchasing power was around 15-20 per cent lower than when Mussolini came to power in 
1922.
This has led Toniolo and Piva (1988, p. 241) to affirm that further wage cuts in the early 
1930s ‘would have entailed a probably unbearable decrease in the already low standard o f living 
o f the working class’, and that ‘even an established dictatorship in the years o f its greatest 
domestic consensus’, as the Fascist regime was at the time, ‘could hardly disregard the 
implications’ of such a policy.
Despite the fact that the government allowed workers’ purchasing power to fall, there is 
some evidence that it tried to prevent too large a fall. For example, De Felice (1974, pp. 69-71) 
described how, in the late 1931 Mussolini, faced with pressures from industrialists for more 
wage cuts, chose not to impose a general reduction, but did nothing to prevent autonomous ones 
by single employers, even beyond the minimum levels set in the collective contracts. At the 
same time however he acted so as to decrease the spread between consumer and wholesale 
prices and the lag o f the adjustment o f the first to the latter ones.
The other main objectives o f the government’s labour market policies seem to have been: 
keeping employment levels high among the adult male labour force (pursued for example by 
public works; the substitution o f adult male workers for women, boys and older men; and wage 
cuts: Toniolo and Piva, 1988, p. 234, have argued that the 1930 wage cut was aimed at 
sacrificing workers’ purchasing power to maintain employment levels); sustaining production 
levels (again via wage cuts); defending the competitiveness o f Italian products with respect to 
foreign ones (again via wage cuts).
All these objectives pushed for wage reductions during the crisis, and would have been 
best pursued by preventing own price real wages from increasing beyond productivity.
To the above mentioned reasons backing a government’s interest in preventing excessive 
real labour costs increases a fourth one can be added: too high real labour costs were bound to 
negatively affect the sustainability o f the Italian lira-gold peg, to which the regime attached a 
high priority.
The preliminary analysis o f the industrial labour market data would seem to support the 
idea that the government did not directly cut wages by more or did not try to make employers
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cut more their wages because real labour costs were not substantially increasing in the industrial 
sectors the government was more interested in. Furthermore, workers’ purchasing power in the 
sectors where real labour costs were indeed increasing was already lower than in the sheltered 
ones. Therefore not only wage cuts were probably not necessary in the sheltered sectors, but 
they could have also increased the risk o f social instability.
However, such a policy was not consistent with all the above listed government’s 
objectives. In particular, it did not defend the competitiveness of Italian exports and the 
sustainability o f the lira-gold parity.
2.4. Labour Productivity and Wage Flexibility
In the previous Section, the increases in real labour costs in the entire industrial sector and
in the sheltered industries’ subsector have been argued to have been insignificant, in particular 
once the labour productivity rise is taken into account. In this Section a measure o f this rise is 
determined.
The main sources o f data on labour productivity in Italy during the inter-war period are 
Fua (1972), Maddison (1991) and Broadberry (1997). All o f them agree that productivity per 
worker increased although they do not give perfectly matching figures on the magnitude o f this 
phenomenon. Fua (1972, Tab. 5.1) has measured the average annual rate o f growth of gross 
product per industrial sector worker, between 1921 and 1938, at 1.7%. On the basis of 
Maddison (1991, Table C. 11, p. 275), the annual average compound growth rate o f GDP per 
man-hour in the entire economy can be measured at 2.4% between 1913 and 1938, a figure 
which it should be possible to consider as a lower bound for that for the industrial sector only. 
Finally, on the basis of Broadberry’s (1997) data on productivity levels in Italian manufacturing 
as a fraction o f the British ones (Table 4.5 p. 56), and his indices of output and employment in 
British manufacturing (Table A 3.1(a), pp. 44-46), the average annual growth rate of 
productivity per worker in Italian manufacturing can be calculated as having been equal to 1.9% 
over the period 1921-1938.
Hence, it would seem possible to argue that a prudent measure o f the average annual 
increase in productivity per worker in the Italian industrial sector between 1921 and 1938 could 
be 1.5%.
Furthermore, all the available sources agree that the average number o f hours worked by 
each industrial sector employee decreased in the same years. According to Tattara and Toniolo 
(1976) and Toniolo (1980), the average working day in manufacturing decreased from 7 hours 
17 minutes in 1929 to 6 hours 43 minutes in 1932 (i.e. by an average annual rate o f 2.7%). On 
the basis o f Zamagni (1976), the number of daily working hours in the industrial sector 
decreased at an average annual rate of 1.26% between 1921 and 1938. Finally, on the basis of
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Maddison (1964, Tables G-l and G-2), the average annual rate o f change o f the number of 
annual working hours per person between 1913 and 1938 can be measured at -1.09%.
Therefore, it would seem possible to argue that the number o f working hours in the Italian 
industrial sector declined on average by at least 1.0% a year between 1921 and 1938.
Thus the just described figures seem to support the hypothesis that productivity per man- 
hour increased on average by at least 2.0% a year between 1921 and 1938.
This is the figure used here to assess whether real wage increases were allowed by 
productivity ones, under the assumption that average productivity was proportional to marginal 
one, which holds for a Cobb-Douglas production function.
This comparison needs a starting point, that is a date at which it can be assumed that the 
industrial labour market was in equilibrium. This is identified as the most recent business cycle 
peak for which there is a good data availability. On the basis o f quarterly data on employment, 
Toniolo (1980, pp. 24-28) has argued that business cycle peaks occurred in March-June 1926 
and the summer 1929. Here the second one is used, because the confederation of industrialists’ 
surveys started only in 1928. Hence the data available for 1926 are not readily comparable with 
those for the 1928-1935 period on which our attention in this chapter is focused.
In Figures 2.9 and 2.10 the actual hourly wage for the entire industrial sector is compared 
with the trend productivity feasible one, obtained by assuming that the labour market was in 
equilibrium in August 1929 and that it was feasible to increase the real wage at the trend 
productivity per man-hour rate, that is by 2.0% a year. Bachi’s index o f wholesale prices of 
manufactured goods is used as deflator.
Despite the prudent estimate o f productivity increases which has been used, it seems that 
the industrial sector as a whole did not suffer from a too rapid real wage growth. In other words, 
nominal wages appear to have been flexible enough with respect to falls in output prices, at least 
when the data for the entire industrial sector are considered.
Therefore it would seem possible to argue that, if there was a problem of insufficient 
nominal wage flexibility, this affected only the industries more exposed to international 
competition, but not the sheltered ones, that is one eighth o f the labour force.
2.5. A Labour Demand Model for Exposed and Sheltered Industries: 
Derivation
The previous Section has supplied further evidence that the main problem o f the Italian 
industrial labour market would not seem to have been one o f insufficient nominal wage 
flexibility, at least in the aggregate.
However, the industrial labour market was subjected from the mid-1929 not only to a 
generalised price fall, but also to a change in relative prices, in particular those of the 
manufactured goods which were exported with respect to those o f goods which were not.
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Therefore the adjustment towards a new equilibrium should have involved not only a general 
fall in wages, but also labour reallocation from the industries exposed to international 
competition to the sheltered ones.
In this Section a labour demand model for exposed and sheltered industries is presented, 
which is then used to study labour allocation and to verify the preliminary conclusion that there 
was enough wage flexibility in Sections 2.6 and 2.7.
A model o f a representative profit maximising firm which faces imperfect competition in 
the goods market but not in the labour market is considered to derive the labour demand 
function. This model differs from that proposed by Layard and Nickell (1985, 1986) because it 
does not incorporate the assumption that also the labour market was imperfectly competitive. 
This does not seem a useful characterisation of the Italian labour market in the period 1929- 
1934, because the existence o f unemployment meant that firms could hire people without 
bidding up their wages. This is the same motivation used by Turner and Bowden (1997) in 
constructing their model for the UK industrial sectors during the period 1921-1938. The model 
used here however differs from theirs because it allows for the presence o f a second variable 
production input besides labour: raw materials, also bought in a perfectly competitive market.
The assumption o f imperfect competition in the goods market implies that the firm faces a 
downward sloping demand curve for its output:
(2.1) x = A
vp  *y
z s ,
where: x is the quantity demanded of the firm’s output; p the own product price; p* the price of 
competing goods; z are demand pressure variables; A, y and 5 are parameters (5 >0 and y>l by 
hypothesis).
Thus the inverse demand curve is:
(2.2) p = A ^p  * x~ez *, where 0:=l/y, and (|>:=S/y.
The production function is assumed to take the following form:
(2.3) x = e B,n a (rm  ) p
where: n is the quantity o f employed labour and rm the quantity o f employed raw materials; t is 
time and the term that contains it represents technical progress and possibly also changes in the 
capital stock, in their turn not explicitly accounted for; B, a , p are parameters, all >0 by 
hypothesis.
The demand functions for labour and raw materials are obtained by equating the marginal 
revenue for each o f these production inputs to its marginal cost (which is equivalent to 
maximising the firm’s profits with respect to each o f the two inputs).
The marginal costs for labour and raw materials are, respectively, the nominal wage, w, 
and the price of raw materials, pm.









Thus the marginal labour revenue equals the marginal labour cost when:
(2.4) w = (l-^)cireBtna'1(rm)/?p(x).
By substituting the inverse output demand function for p(x) and then the production 
function for x the above condition becomes:
(2.5) w = (1 - 0) aAe p * z*na~a0'] (rmY ~pe.
The marginal revenue with respect to raw materials is:
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T hus the m arginal raw  m aterials revenue equals the m arginal raw  m aterials cost w hen:
(2.6) p m= ( l - 0 ) / f e B,n“ (rm)'M p(x).
By substitu ting the inverse ou tput dem and function  fo r p(x) and then the production 
function for x  the above condition becom es:
(2.7) pm = (1 - 0)/7A9eB(l‘s|,p * z*n"‘‘,s(r m )^ '1.
T hus the dem and functions for labour and raw  m aterials can be obtained from  the 
fo llow ing  system :
I w = (1 - #)aA9eB<l'9,,p * z*na~ae ' (rm )^9 
lp m = ( l-^ )M ‘'eB"'t'),p * z 'n “-“', (rm)/’-*M '
From the first equation of the system:
(2.9) (1 - 0 )A e e B{l'0)x p * z* =  v j a An Uced~a {rm) pe~p .
From  the second equation o f  the system :
(2.10) (1 -0)A 9eB<l‘9),p* z*1 = x>mP~'nae~a .
B ecause the left hand sides o f  (2.9) and (2.10) are identical, the tw o righ t hand sides have 




rm =  n . 
«  Pm
The right hand side o f (2.11) can now be substituted for rm in the first equation o f the 
system (2.8) to obtain the labour demand function (the raw materials demand function can then 
be obtained by substituting the labour demand one for n in the right hand side o f this last 
equation):
(2 .12)




Then solving for n:
(2.13) n Ha+m-0) = ( 1 .  e ) a ^e-PpP-POA oQ W
This equation is equivalent to:
-V  \  w
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or
n  = [(i . 0 ) a x+pe~ppP-PepJ>^Ha+m'0)}QW-0w\Ha+P*\-8)]
(2.15) w /  \
v p * ;
where the real wage and the real raw material price, rather than the real wage and the relative 
price o f the two production inputs, appear among the determinants o f labour demand. This last 
equation is the formulation of the labour demand function that will be considered in the 
following.
As a model for the demand pressure variables to be included in this labour demand 
function, the following one, very similar to that used by Turner and Bowden (1997), is 
considered:
(2.16) z = (w t)'
Vp 7
(rdisc)^3 e u,
where wt is a quantity o f world trade index, m/p’ is a measure o f real money supply, rdisc the 
real discount rate (this last variable was not considered by Turner and Bowden, 1997), and u is a 
random sector specific disturbance term. All parameters are positive.
It remains to be checked whether the signs o f the model parameters are plausible.
The demand pressure variables parameters have the same sign as (J>/[l-(a+P)(l-0)]. For this 
parameter to be positive, as it would seem reasonable, [l-(cc+P)(l-0)] has to be positive 
(because <))>0). [l-(a+P)(l-0)]>O when 0> l-l/(a+ P ). In the only relevant case, that is when 
(a+ p)< l, l-l/(a+p)< 0  and all values o f 0 in the interval ]0, 1[ make the demand pressure 
parameters values positive (because y>l by hypothesis, then 0<1).
When the demand pressure variables coefficients are positive, then the coefficient of 
(w/p*) is negative when [P(l-0)-l]<O, that is when 0 > l- l/p . Therefore, because [1- 
l/(a+P )]> (l-l/p ), this coefficient is always negative when the demand pressure variables 
coefficients are positive.
Moreover, when the demand pressure variables have a positive coefficient, then for the 
time trend to have a positive coefficient as well (1-0) has to be positive, which happens when 
0<1.
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In this case the coefficient on (pm/p*) becomes negative.
Because [l-l/(a+(3)]<l, there can be values o f 0 in the interval ] l- l/(a+ p ); 1[, that is 
values o f 0 which make the parameters on demand pressure variables and that for the time trend 
positive, and those on (w/p*) and (pm/p*) negative.
2.6. Labour Demand Functions for Exposed and Sheltered Industries: 
Specification and Estimation
The labour demand equation estimated here for exposed and sheltered industries is 
obtained from the one derived above, considered in conjunction with the model for demand 
pressure variables, by taking the logarithms o f both sides and allowing for some delay in the 
process o f adjustment o f actual employment levels to the desired ones:
l n ( n u ) =  b o  +  V n ( w . t / P i , , ) + b 2 l n (Pm,t / P , , ) + b 3l n ( w ‘ ),  + b 4 l n ( m / p ' ) t +
+ b5ln(rdisc)t + b6ln(nj t_,)+  b7t + v t t
where: nj,t is the number o f employed workers in sector i at time t; wj?t the nominal hourly wage 
they are paid; pi t a wholesale price index, used as a measure o f the price o f competing goods 
(i.e. the price denoted as p* in Section 2.5); pm?t an index o f wholesale prices o f raw materials; 
wt a quantum index o f world trade; m a measure o f money supply; p’ a cost o f living index; 
rdisc the real discount rate; t a linear time trend; Vjjt an error term; and the index V stands either 
for exposed, Y , or sheltered, Y , industries. The demand pressure variables, wt, m/p’ and rdisc, 
are measured as indices with value equal to 100 in August 1929, so that they measure the 
demand conditions at each point in time with respect to a benchmark. Finally, the estimated 
equations include also seasonals among the regressors.
Both the real wage and the real raw material price variables are considered as endogenous 
in the previous equation. This is because, as Turner and Bowden (1997) have highlighted, if the 
goods market is imperfectly competitive, then the output price is likely to be modified together 
with output and employment levels when the firm reacts to demand changes.
Each o f these two endogenous variables is instrumented by its first lag, even if there can be 
theoretical reasons to think that these are not the best instruments, because they are here the 
most suitable choice conditionally upon the available data.
The above labour demand model differs in many respects from that estimated on the 
industries identified in the confederation of industrialists’ surveys by Toniolo and Piva (1988). 
In their model the endogenous variable is the number o f worked hours rather than that of 
employed workers, and the only regressors are a measure o f the own product wage and the 
quantity o f imported raw materials as a proxy for industrial production (plus a constant and 
seasonals). This specification leaves out the demand pressure variables used here and the real
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price o f the second variable production input, but fails also to account for the possibility that the 
own product wage is endogenous, a circumstance which would make the estimates inconsistent.
The above equation is estimated for exposed and sheltered sectors.
The data used are the following. For n^: average number o f factory workers employed 
daily in exposed and sheltered industries, as from the confederation of industrialists’ surveys. 
For W j>t: nominal hourly wage paid to factory workers in exposed and sheltered industries, from 
the same source. For p j >t: for exposed industries, the index o f prices o f exports o f manufactured 
goods denoted as manufexP in Section 2.3; for sheltered ones, the wholesale price index of 
manufactured goods denoted as (Bachi)manufWPI in Section 2.3. For pmt: the index of 
wholesale prices of raw materials calculated by Bachi on the basis o f 37-40 items observed in 
the same industrial cities as for (Bachi)manufWPI, and published in ISTAT, Bollettino Mensile 
di Statistica, Rome, various issues. For wt: the series obtained by interpolating the quarterly one 
published in League of Nations, Monthly Bulletin o f Statistics, Geneva, transformed into an 
index with value equal to 100 in August 1929. For m: the series on banknote circulation 
published in Cotula and Spaventa (1993, Tav. A.9, pp. 846-848, col. B) (no broader monetary 
aggregate used at the time is available at a frequency higher than the year). For p ’: the ISTAT 
cost o f living index used in Section 2.3. As already mentioned, the real money supply variable 
used in the regressions is obtained by transforming into an index with value equal to 100 in 
August 1929 the series obtained as ratio o f the just indicated ones. Finally, rdisc is in its turn the 
transformation into a similar index o f the real discount rate measure obtained by subtracting 
from the nominal private discount rate (published in Cotula and Spaventa, 1993, Tav. A. 12, pp. 
853-855) a measure o f inflation based on the ISTAT cost o f living index. All these series are 
monthly and refer to the period February 1929-December 1934.
The estimation o f the labour demand equations for exposed and sheltered sectors has been 
preceded by an investigation into whether the employment variables are cointegrated with 
various subsets o f regressors. The rationale behind it is that the ADF unit root tests conducted 
on employment variables and explanatory ones all fail to reject their null hypothesis. However, 
no cointegration relation has been found. Therefore, the labour demand equations for exposed 
and sheltered industries have been estimated in the specification written above, via the 
instrumental variables method. The estimation results are presented in Table 2.2.
The residuals o f the two estimated equations show no sign o f autocorrelation (due also to 
the inclusion o f  the additional lag o f the employment variable for sheltered industries) or 
heteroskedasticity, but those for sheltered industries appear as non normal.
The analysis in the next Section on the adjustment needed to reach a new equilibrium is 
based on the static long run versions o f the estimated equations, which are:
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(SE) (2.285) (0.9577) (0.4429) (0.3283)
-  0.8945 * ln(m / p')t -  0.04663 * ln(rdisc)t + 0.007206 * t + 0.3179 * seasonal
(1.402) (0.05254) (0.0114) (0.4507)
(SE) (5.998) (1.059) (0.3992) (0.5748)
-  0.7036 *ln(m /p')t -0.04041 *ln(rdisc)t + 0.00465 * t + 2.009 * seasonal 
(0.9608) (0.06148) (0.00383) (0.7973)
Only few o f the included regressors are significant in each equation. However, the point 
estimates o f labour demand elasticities with respect to the real wage seem plausible. 
Furthermore, the main difference between the two static long run equations seems to be the fact 
that the world trade index significantly affects employment in the exposed but not in the 
sheltered industries.
Figures 2.11 and 2.12 show that the fitting o f both equations is very good.
An attempt has been made to exploit the correlation between disturbances for exposed and 
sheltered industries to improve the estimation efficiency by considering the equations for the 
two sectors as a system of seemingly unrelated regressions. However, no substantial 
improvement has been obtained. Therefore, the analysis o f the adjustment towards a new 
equilibrium in the next Section is based on the estimates equation by equation presented above.
2.7. Labour Demand Functions for Exposed and Sheltered Industries: 
Implications for Equilibrium Wages and Labour Allocation
As already mentioned, the estimated equations are used to measure the adjustments in
wages and labour allocation between exposed and sheltered industries needed to bring the 
industrial labour market back to equilibrium, after the general price falls, the changes in relative 
prices, and the demand reductions during the economic crisis.
These calculations are made under the assumption that the market was in equilibrium in 
August 1929. The date at which the adjustments towards equilibrium are measured is February 
1934, just before the April 1934 general wage cut. Furthermore, the total number o f employed 
factory workers is required to be the same in the new equilibrium as in old one.
The equilibrium in February 1934 is identified by the following vector o f variables: (we,34 , 
wS)3 4 , ne>34 , ns>3 4), where the index ‘3 4 4 indicates the value o f the variable in February 1934.
The equilibrium conditions are:
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•  We,34 =  Ws,34 - 0.70;
•  ne,34+ ns,34 = ne,2 9+ ns ,29 (where s2 9 ‘ indicates the value o f the variable in August 1929);
• we ,34 is given by the exponential o f the inverse labour demand function for exposed 
sectors (or, the equivalent condition for sheltered sectors).
The equilibrium is found by equating the exponential o f the inverse labour demand 
function for exposed industries to the exponential o f the inverse labour demand function for 
sheltered ones minus 0.70 (where for both demand functions, the estimated static long run 
versions presented above are used); by substituting in this equation the expression for ns ,34 given 
by the second equilibrium condition (i.e. ns,34 = (ne,29+ ns,2 9) - ne,3 4); by giving to all the 
variables in this equation apart from 1 ^ ,3 4  their values in February 1934 and to all the parameters 
their estimated values; and by numerically solving for the only remaining unknown ne ,34 the so 
obtained equation.
The equilibrium thus found is: w e ,34 = 0.93 Italian lira; w s,34 = 1.63 Italian lira; ne,34 = 
768,597; ns,34 = 596,163.
The equilibrium we ,34 and w s ,34 are 0.55-0.56 Italian lira (or, respectively, 38 and 25%) 
lower than the actual wages at that time (respectively, 1.49 and 2.18 lira). The equilibrium ne ,34 
and ns ,34  are higher by, respectively, 296,488 and 121,777 employed factory workers (or, 
respectively, by 63 and 26%) than the actual figures at that time (respectively, 472,109 and 
474,386).
These equilibrium wages seem to indicate that the price shocks and demand decline 
between mid-1929 and early 1934 would have required much larger wage cuts than the 
implemented ones for industrial employment to remain at its earlier level, even if the order of 
magnitude rather than the precise values of the calculated equilibrium wages is considered. This 
result differs from the provisional conclusions drawn at the end of the analysis in Sections 2.3 
and 2.4, which however have not taken into account the demand variables or the raw material 
prices.
In April 1934 the Fascist government decreed a further (and last) general cut in all wages 
and salaries. However, this decreased nominal hourly wages in exposed and sheltered industries 
in the following months by no more than 0 . 1 0  lira, that is by less than a fifth of what would 
have been required according to the calculations presented above.
It would seem possible to conclude this analysis arguing, in agreement with Toniolo and 
Piva (1988), that among the reasons why the government did not act to cause larger wage 
reductions may have been the idea that such cuts could have been non socially feasible.
Finally, it has to be mentioned that the calculated equilibrium allocation of labour would 
require a larger share of workers to be employed in exposed industries than it was the case in 
August 1929 (768,597 workers rather than 708,601 out o f a total number constant by
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hypothesis), a result which would seem non fully consistent with the nature o f the changes in 
prices and demand pressure variables, or with the government policies.
2.8. Conclusions
In this chapter a study o f the Italian industrial labour market between the late 1920s and 
the mid-1930s has been conducted.
The main features of this market as described in the previous literature have been recalled.
Then it has been investigated the extent to which real wages increased when prices fell, 
and how these measures depend on which prices are used to deflate wages. This preliminary 
analysis has led to affirm that nominal wage decreases were large enough to prevent a 
significant rise in real labour costs in the industries more sheltered from international 
competition, but not in those more exposed to it, which were affected by much larger falls in 
their output prices.
This preliminary conclusion has been reinforced when a measure o f the trend productivity 
increase per man-hour has been considered and the wage increases made feasible by it 
calculated.
When however the estimates of labour demand equations for exposed and sheltered 
industries (formally derived within a model of a profit maximising representative firm, facing 
imperfect competition in the goods market but not in the labour one) have been used to calculate 
the equilibrium wages and labour allocation between industries at the beginning o f 1934, further 
wage falls have appeared as needed to keep industrial employment at its pre-crisis level in the 
face o f the demand and absolute and relative price shocks o f the period.
These results would seem to confirm those previously obtained by Toniolo and Piva
(1988). Moreover they seem to be consistent with an interpretation o f why nominal wages were 
not cut by more based not only on the risk that these further cuts could have created social 
instability, but also on the circumstance that real labour costs were not increasing in the 
industries the government was more interested in.
Furthermore, this chapter’s results appear to be consistent also with Mattesini and 
Quintieri’s (1997) ones, albeit the evidence presented here on the relevance o f the wage
deflator’s choice would seem to suggest that it could be interesting to verily the robustness of
their conclusions with respect to different and possibly more suitable wage deflators.
Moreover, the results obtained here on the role o f labour costs in the decline in industrial 
labour demand are consistent also with Perri and Quadrini’s (2002) ones for the entire non farm 
sector.
Finally, it is worth underlining that there was an alternative policy available to the 
government: to abandon the Italian lira-gold parity set in December 1927, to which Mussolini 
attached a great symbolic value, and which was kept despite the devaluations o f the UK pound,
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in September 1931, and the US dollar, in April 1933. This policy has been advocated as a way 
to exit from the economic crisis in the recent literature (see for example the seminal 
Eichengreen and Sachs, 1985); and its possible relevance in the Italian case has been argued, for 
example, by Toniolo (1980). It was only in December 1934 that the Fascist government 
eventually effectively suspended the convertibility o f its currency.
52
Table 2.1: Average Nominal Hourly Wage of Factory Workers: Discrepancies Between Two 
Observations for the Same Months in the Confederation of Industrialists’ Surveys (April 1928- 
________ August 1935)__________________________________________________________________________
Absolute value o f  the 
discrepancy between 1st and 
2nd observation (Italian lira 
and cents)
Number o f  
occurrences in the 
aggregate industrial 
sector
Number o f  occurrences 
in the industrial sectors 
exposed to international 
competition
Number o f  occurrences in 
the industrial sectors 
protected from  
international competition
0.00 6 15 6
0.01 20 10 9
0.02 10 7 10
0.03 3 3 12
0.04 3 4 6













Total number o f months for 48 48 48
which there are double
observations
Table 2.2: Estimation Results for Exposed and Sheltered Industries: IVE on the Periods 3/1929-12/1934 
________ and 4/1929-12/1934 Respectively_________ _______________________________________________
Exposed Industries Exposed Industries Sheltered Industries Sheltered Industries
Variable Coefficient (and t-value) Variable Coefficient (and t-value)
constant 4.4928 constant 2.6366
(2.914) (1.690)
Ln(we/pe) -0.34739 ln(ws/ps) -0.21226
(-0.983) (-0.747)
Ln(pm/pe) 0.068458 ln(pm/ps) 0.081055
(0.375) (0.816)
Ln(wt) 0.27631 ln(wt) 0.17577
(1.660) (1.164)
Ln(m/p’) -0.36252 ln(m/p’) -0.18024
(-0.908) (-0.799)
Ln(rdisc) -0.018898 ln(rdisc) -0.010352
(-0.898) (-0.610)




T 0.0029203 t 0.0011913
(0.678) (1.310)
NOTE: seasonal dummies are included in the regressions but not reported.
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Figure 2.1: Nominal Hourly Wages of Factory Workers (Indices with Average over 1929 Equal to 100): 
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Figure 2.5: Nominal Hourly Wages of Factory Workers in Industries Exposed to and Sheltered From 
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Figure 2.6: Nominal Hourly Wages of Factory Workers in Exposed Sectors Deflated by Prices of 
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Figure 2.7: Nominal Hourly Wages o f Factory Workers in Exposed Sectors Deflated by Wholesale Price 
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Figure 2.8: Nominal Hourly Wages o f Factory Workers in Sheltered Sectors Deflated by Wholesale Price 









 sheltered s. h .w /m an u fW P I(C P E M I)
 sheltered s. h .w /m anufW PI(B achi)
 sheltered s. h .w /W PI
r g > f 1g 5 r ( b r g > r g > r £ > n £ n £ > r § :> r >J > . 0 3 N> n J t- r S \ . r 5 V n J W n £ ) r £ > f £ > »5>‘ n j f c n 31>> n £ > n < 3
^  ^  c f '  ^  ^  o f  f  ^  c f  f  ^  c f  f  ^  ^  c f  f  ^  c f  f  ^
57







■ actual real hourly w age
•trend productiv ity  feasib le  real hourly  
w ag e








- actual nominal hourly w age
■trend productivity feasible nominal hourly 
w age
Figure 2.11: Actual and Fitted Values From the Estimated Labour Demand Equation for Exposed 
Industries
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Figure 2.12: Actual and Fitted Values From the Estimated Labour Demand Equation for Sheltered 
Industries
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CONCLUSIONS
Italy was on the Gold Standard between December 1927 and the de facto  suspension of 
currency convertibility in December 1934. Furthermore, its economy was in crisis from the 
latter part o f 1929 and did not experience a significant recovery until 1935. Hence the Italian 
case would seem to be one for which the evidence appears consistent with the hypothesis that 
Gold Standard membership prolonged and deepened the economic crisis.
In this study, the credibility in the eyes o f the international financial markets o f the 
commitment to remain in this exchange rate regime and the effects o f the economic crisis, and 
hence also of this commitment, on the labour market have been investigated. In doing so, the 
consequences of the dictatorial nature o f the country’s government have also been considered.
Our analysis o f the international financial markets expectations on the Italian lira-gold 
parity has led us to conclude that a devaluation o f the currency was anticipated from the autumn 
1929, but that none of the macroeconomic variables usually considered in models o f exchange 
rate and balance o f payments determination seems responsible for this low confidence in the 
sustainability o f the gold peg. These results differ from those obtained in particular by 
Hailwood, MacDonald and Marsh (1996, 1997), who found no evidence o f persistent 
expectations o f devaluation, unexplained by similar macroeconomic variables, that did not 
precede an actual devaluation for the classical and inter-war Gold Standard exchange rates they 
considered. However, our results for the Italian lira-gold parity do seem consistent with 
evidence gathered from documents o f the time (both from archival sources and from the 
financial press).
It would seem that the Italian government, as far as it could affect them, was able to 
prevent that any o f the macroeconomic variables considered as possible explanatory ones 
deviated from a pattern consistent with the Gold Standard constraints enough to support 
expectations of its abandonment. However, it would appear that the role of the government’s 
actual policies in the formation o f the financial markets’ expectations may have been less 
important than that of other determinants, in particular the dictatorial nature o f the political 
regime. To this end we noted: that the Fascist government’s decision process was less 
transparent than those of democratic executives; that it exerted a censorship which affected the 
perceived reliability o f officially published economic data; and that it shared control with the 
central bank over the discount rate, thus inducing suspicion that monetary policy could have 
been aimed at other objectives instead o f preserving the gold parity. All these elements may 
have made it difficult for foreign observers to correctly assess not only the sustainability o f the 
exchange rate regime, but also the very stability o f the political regime. Hence it would seem 
possible to argue that, in the presence o f expectations o f a devaluation of the Italian currency, 
which increased the costs o f remaining in the Gold Standard (for example, by causing reserve 
losses which had to be followed by monetary tightening, which in turn only worsened the
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economic crisis), the relatively small influence o f actual policy on expectations could have been 
an additional reason for an early exit from the exchange rate regime.
Our analysis o f real labour costs in the Italian industrial labour market during the 
Depression (1929-1934) has supplied evidence that they rose faster than productivity in 
industries that were exposed to international competition, but not in those sheltered from it. 
However, the estimation o f labour demand functions (based on a model of a profit maximising 
representative firm facing imperfect competition in the output market) for the two sets of 
industries has suggested that further substantial cuts in nominal wages across all industries 
would have been needed to keep labour demand at its pre-crisis peak, to counterbalance the 
effects o f movements not only in output prices, but also in input prices and aggregate demand.
These results are broadly consistent with those in previous literature on the Italian 
industrial labour market during the Depression. Furthermore they add some extra insights. In 
particular, the evidence o f the importance of an appropriate choice o f wage deflator would 
suggest that it could be worthwhile checking the robustness o f Mattesini and Quintieri’s (1997) 
results to changes in their measure o f real wages. Moreover, the fact that real labour cost did not 
rise faster than productivity in the industries the government was more interested in could 
explain why it did not intervene to induce or force further wage cuts. Another factor that may 
have played a role in discouraging the government from using its powers o f intervention in the 
labour market is that the worsening o f factory workers’ living standards throughout all the 
Fascist period could have meant that by the early 1930s they were approaching a lower bound 
below which social unrest would have occurred; a similar suggestion has been put forward by 
Toniolo and Piva (1988).
Finally this analysis suggests that a currency devaluation, accompanied by reflationary 
policies to generate price increases, could have reduced real labour costs and thus strengthened 
labour demand at constant nominal wages. It would therefore seem to confirm the thesis of 
Toniolo (1980) that an earlier abandonment of the gold peg would have been beneficial, and that 
the refusal by the Fascist regime to consider it contributed to the length and depth of the 
economic crisis. Therefore, insofar as the obstinacy with which the Fascist leadership stuck to 
the commitment to defend the Italian lira-gold parity, even after the most important members of 
the Gold Standard (UK and US) had abandoned it, can be attributed to the government’s 
perception that it would thereby improve the international reputation o f the country, and to the 
extent that this need was more acute (or was considered to be so) due to the dictatorship, the 
consequences can really be considered as an economic cost o f the lack o f democracy.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A.1: Estimates of Gold Points and Their Violations
On the basis of the data on costs o f gold transfers to and from Italy found in ASBI
documents and o f interest rates, some estimates of gold points for the lira exchange rates with 
respect to US dollar, UK pound and French franc are calculated.
None o f these estimates take into account the additional costs arising because of 
convertibility restrictions. Therefore, the estimated gold export points can be considered as 
lower bounds o f the actual values.
A. 1.1. Gold Point Estimates and Violations for the Lira/Dollar Exchange Rate
Data on the costs o f gold transfers between Italy and New York in the early 1928 and in
late 1932 or early 1933 have been found in ASBI documents.
The first calculation o f gold points is based on the data on gold transfer costs contained in 
a letter written by the delegate o f the Bank of Italy in New York, Podesta, to the Bank’s 
Governor, Stringher, on 27 January 1928 (see ASBI, Introna Ispettore, pratt., n. 3, fasc. I). 
Podesta considered a gold transfer between New York and Naples and specified the following 
costs:
for gold transfers from New York to Naples: 
packing
transportation from the Federal Reserve Bank 
to the steamer 
freight (New York-Naples) 
insurance
interest loss (10 days; interest rate=3.5%)8 
total costs per dollar










$0.052859, or 18.918 lira
for gold transfers from Naples to New York: 
handling 0.0035%
freight (Naples-New York) 0.2500%
insurance 0.0750%
mint expenses9 0.00127%
interest loss for the journey (10 days; interest 0.0972% 
rate=3.5%)
8 This interest rate was the official discount rate in New York at the date o f the letter.
9 Podesta was able to specify the mint expenses in New York but he did not know whether the Bank of 
Italy would have charged gold importers with similar costs.
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interest loss on 2% of gold value in New 0.0019%
York (10 days; interest rate=3.5%)10 
total costs per dollar 0.4403%
total costs per lira (at the parity o f $0.052631 $0.000232 
per lira)
gold export point $0.052392, or 19.084 lira
It is worth noting that in all his calculations Podesta did not consider the costs o f gold 
transfers between Naples and Rome. Therefore the actual gold export and import costs were 
higher that the estimated ones.
Podesta also calculated the gold import point for a 14 rather than 10 day journey and for 
different New York interest rates. In particular, when the interest loss was calculated for a 14 
day journey at a 4% interest rate (i.e. the New York private discount rate), the gold import point 
became 18.908 lira per dollar (and the gold export point 19.092); when a 14 day interest loss at 
a 4.5% interest rate (i.e. the New York call money rate) was considered, the gold import point 
became 18.904 lira (and the gold export point 19.096). Finally, when a 10 day interest loss at 
the Italian private discount rate o f 6.25% was considered, the gold import and export points 
became respectively 18.904 and 19.099.
The issue of which interest rate should be used when calculating gold points has been 
considered by Officer (1996). He has noted that the “[ijnterest loss was an opportunity cost for 
the arbitrageurs/transferors” (p. 162) and therefore the relevant interest rate was that on 
alternative investment opportunities available to these agents. In the case of the dollar/sterling 
exchange rate considered by Officer, the dominant arbitrageurs were the New York banks. 
Therefore Officer has identified the “pertinent interest rate” as “that obtainable on loans placed 
in the New York call-money market” (ibidem).
However Officer’s criterion does not seem to be useful for the estimation o f gold points for 
the lira exchange rates. As a matter o f fact there is no evidence o f gold exports from Italy before 
March 1934," while the gold imports seem to have been organised not by private agents when 
the lira was particularly strong, but rather by the Bank of Italy, in its efforts to increase the share 
of gold reserves with respect to those in gold currencies, and independently from their 
profitability.12
10 The New York Mint paid 98% of gold value on delivery and the remaining 2% within ten days.
11 The stock of gold reserves is non decreasing from December 1927 to February 1934. Furthermore, no 
mention of gold outflows before March 1934 has been found in archive documents. It can be noted that 
this evidence is consistent with the restrictions to lira convertibility described in Section 1.2.
12 Various archive documents mention such gold imports. See, among the others, the letter to the New 
York Federal Reserve Bank vice-governor, Harrison, by his deputy, Crane, on 23 May 1928, where 
Stringher’s plans to import gold from New York were described (doc. 209 in De Cecco, 1993); the 
quotations from American financial press reported by the New York Bank of Italy’s delegate, Podesta, in 
his memorandum on the week 15-20 September 1930, where a large gold import from New York to Italy 
is attributed to the Bank of Italy, because of its occurrence at a time when the lira/dollar exchange rate 
would have made gold export from Italy profitable (ASBI, Segreteria Particolare, pratt., n. 66, fasc. 1);
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According to Officer’s criterion, the Bank of Italy being the only agent in gold imports, it 
could be argued that the interest cost o f gold import should be the interest rate on its alternative 
investment, hence maybe the Italian official discount rate. However this seems to be just a 
superficial application of Officer’s criterion, because the Bank of Italy was not deciding its gold 
imports on the grounds o f their profitability.
The application o f Officer’s criterion to gold exports is even more difficult. As the Bank of 
Italy was converting lira into foreign currencies only, the gold exports should have involved an 
intermediate country, whose central bank could have sold gold against its currency. To the best 
o f my knowledge, no evidence o f this kind o f triangular gold exports has been found. Hence an 
attempt to identity the main agents implementing it, maybe by referring to the dominant ones in 
the dollar/sterling case, could be just speculation.
Therefore the choice o f the appropriate interest rates in the estimation of gold import and 
export costs remains an open problem.
It can finally be mentioned that the delegate o f the Bank o f Italy in London, Nathan, 
argued that the agents implementing gold transfers (he was considering the London-Rome and 
Rome-London journeys) would have been in the importing country, and that therefore an 
interest rate o f the destination country should have been used to calculate gold points (see 
Nathan’s letter to the Bank’s Director General, Azzolini, on 28 September 1928 in ASBI, 
Rapporti con l’Estero, cpl., n. 143).
In the above estimations, the gold import point decreases from 18.918 to 18.904 and the 
gold export point increases from 19.084 to 19.099 if a 10 day interest loss is calculated on the 
basis o f the Italian private discount rate (6.25%) rather than the official discount rate in New 
York (3.5%).
If these gold points are interpreted as allowed percentage fluctuations around the 19 lira to 
the dollar parity, it can be noted that while the 3.5% rate would have allowed a 4.3%o lira 
appreciation and a 4.4%o lira depreciation, the 6.25% rate would have allowed a 5.1%o lira 
appreciation and a 5.2%o lira depreciation, that is a 0.8%o wider band on both sides.
The Italian translation o f a telegram sent on 2 March 1928 to the Bank of Italy by the 
Guaranty Trust Company o f New York, in reply to a request o f information by the Bank, allows 
a further gold point estimation (the document is in ASBI, Rapporti con 1’Estero, pratt., n. 342, 
fasc. 8). The cost elements reported in the document referred to a New York-Naples (or Rome) 





the Bank of Italy’s internal documents mentioning gold imports from New York on 16 July 1931 (ASBI, 






If the Italian official discount rate (6.5%) on 10 March 1928 (date of the planned beginning 
o f the journey according to the document) is considered as the appropriate opportunity cost, 
because the gold transfer would have been paid by the Bank of Italy, then the gold import point 
estimate is 18.902 for a 10 day interest loss, and 18.888 for a 14 day interest loss.
If the assumption is made that all elements of cost apart from the interest loss are equal for 
gold import and export,13 also the gold export point can be calculated. If the Italian official 
discount rate is used to determine the interest loss, the gold export point estimate is 19.100 for a 
10 day journey and 19.114 for a 14 day journey. If the official discount rate in New York 
(4.0%) is used, the gold export point estimate is 19.087 for a 10 day journey and 19.095 for a 14 
day journey.
From internal Bank of Italy’s notes dated 21 March 1928 (see ASBI, Rapporti con 
l’Estero, pratt., n. 342, fasc. 8) further estimations o f gold points can be made. These notes 
contained the following elements o f cost for a gold transfer from New York to Naples (as for 
the calculations based on the above described Podesta’s letter, the actual gold import costs were 








In the document, the interest loss was calculated for a 15 day journey at a 2.5% interest 
rate. At the time, the official discount rate in New York was 4%, while the Bank o f Italy’s one 
was 6.5%. Thus the 2.5% rate seems too low, no matter what criterion was used to choose it. If 
the Italian official discount rate is considered as the appropriate opportunity cost, because the 
prospective gold import was being planned by the Bank of Italy, then the gold import point is 
18.888 lira per dollar.14
If  the assumption is made that all elements of cost apart from the interest loss are equal for 
gold import and export,15 also the gold export point can be calculated. If the Italian official
13 This is not strictly true. For example, the above described Podesta’s letter indicated the costs at the 
New York Mint. Here these costs will be neglected. Thus, the calculated gold export point should be 
interpreted as lower than the actual one.
14 With a 2.5% interest rate, the gold import point is 18.918.
15 The same caveat highlighted in the previous case holds also here (see note 6).
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discount rate is used to determine the interest loss on a 15 day journey, the gold export point is 
19.114. If the official discount rate in New York is used, the gold export point is 19.094.
A final set o f gold point estimations for the lira/dollar exchange rate can be based on the 
data on the costs for a gold transfer from New York to Genoa or Naples presented in a further 
Bank of Italy’s internal memorandum (see ASBI, Rapporti con l’Estero, pratt., n. 342, fasc. 8).16 
The document is undated, but its position in the file strongly supports the opinion that it was 







The interest losses are calculated on the basis o f the Italian official discount rate. If the 
document was written between 2 May 1932 and 8 January 1933 (hence the relevant interest rate 
is 5.00%), the gold points are 18.913 and 19.088 for a 10 day journey and 18.903 and 19.099 for 
a 14 day journey. If the document was written between 9 January and 8 March 1933 (hence the 
relevant interest rate is 4.00%), the gold points are 18.918 and 19.083 for a 10 day journey and 
18.910 and 19.092 fo ra  14 day journey.
It can be noted that the values o f some of the costs were equal in all the examined 
documents (these include freight, packing, commission and customs expenses; these last two 
elements however were not considered by Podesta), while the reported insurance cost decreased 
with time (from 0.0750% in the first two documents, to 0.0570% in the third and to 0.0557% in 
the last).
Gold import point estimates lie in [18.888; 18.918]; gold export point estimates lie in 
[19.083; 19.114]. These estimates imply a maximum allowed lira appreciation and depreciation 
against the dollar between 4.3-4.4%o and 5.9-6.0%o of the 19 lira per dollar parity. The 
maximum appreciation and depreciation allowed by the 18.90-19.10 gold points was by 5.3%o.
Besides the uncertainty in the calculation o f interest losses (due to the choice o f both the 
interest rate and the length o f the journey), these gold point estimates may be affected by an 
undervaluation of gold transfer costs. The costs o f the gold transportation do not refer, at least in 
three out of the four considered documents, to the complete journey. Apart from the estimates
15 As in the previous lira/dollar gold point estimates, also in this case the costs for the journey from Genoa
or Naples to Rome are neglected. Thus, also in this case, the actual gold transfer costs were higher than 
the estimated ones.
17 In the document, three levels of insurance costs are presented. Here the lowest is reported, so as to 
prudently estimate gold transfer costs.
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based on Podesta’s letter, the others do not include mint expenses in New York. No estimate 
includes the costs arising from convertibility restrictions.
These observations would seem to suggest that the gold points set by the February 1928 
royal decree may have undervalued actual gold transfer costs. Therefore an assessment of gold 
point violations based on the 18.90-19.10 gold points could be excessively severe. However the 
following analysis of gold point violations is based on them, because they are near to the means 
o f the intervals containing the gold point estimates and because they seem to have influenced 
markets’ confidence on the lira-gold parity (see Section 1.3.3).
The 18.90-19.10 gold points are compared with end o f month data on spot, one-month- 
ahead and three-month-ahead forward lira/dollar exchange rates (from Einzig, 1937, Appendix
I).
On the period January 1928-August 1931, the spot rate violated the 18.90 gold import 
point by no more than 0.11%; the one-month-ahead forward rate by no more than 0.05%; while 
the three-month-ahead forward rate did not violate this gold point. On the same period, the spot 
rate violated the 19.10 gold export point by no more than 0.16%; the one-month-ahead forward 
rate by no more than 0.34%; the three-month-ahead forward rate by no more than 0.84%.
However on the period September 1931-February 1933, spot and forward exchange rates 
were always above the 19.10 gold export point. In each month o f the period, the spot rate 
violated this gold export point by a percentage lying in [0.73%; 4.95%]. The corresponding 
intervals for the one-month-ahead and three-month-ahead forward rates are, respectively, 
[1.15%; 5.86%] and [1.15%; 7.91%].
It would seem that the 19 lira per dollar parity was no longer credible after the pound crisis 
in September 1931 and that, from this date, the lira/dollar exchange rate regime was not a target 
zone centred around the 19 lira per dollar parity.
Nevertheless it would seem possible to argue that before September 1931 the violations of 
the 18.90-19.10 gold points do not impair the interpretation o f the lira/dollar exchange rate 
regime as a target zone. All the more so in the light of the observation that very small extra 
costs o f gold export due to the convertibility restrictions would be enough for the conclusion 
that no violation of the 19.10 point occurred to be warranted.
A.1.2. Gold Point Estimates and Violations for the Lira/Pound Exchange Rate
The only document containing information on the costs o f gold transfers between London
and Rome that has been found in ASBI is the letter written by the Bank of Italy’s delegate in 
London, Nathan, to the Bank’s Director General, Azzolini, on 28 September 1928 that has been 
mentioned in the previous Section with regard to the choice of the appropriate interest rate (see
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ASBI, Rapporti con l’Estero, cpl., n. 143).18 The data on the cost of gold transfers presented by 
Nathan are:
0.19 lira per pound of gold value 
0.045 lira per pound of gold value 
0.004 lira per pound of gold value 
0.056 lira per pound of gold value 
0.295 lira per pound of gold value
escorted transport from London to Rome
insurance
packing
interest loss (4 days; interest rate=5.25%) 
total costs
Nathan used the total costs based on the 5.25% Italian private discount rate to determine 
the gold import point at 92.17 lira per pound, but he used a 4.25% British interest rate to 
calculate the gold export point at 92.75 lira per pound, due to his assumption that the agent 
paying the gold transfer was in the importing country.
Between January 1928 and August 1931, the spot lira/pound exchange rate19 violated the 
92.17 gold import point by no more than 0.12%; the one-month-ahead forward lira/pound 
exchange rate by no more than 0.03%; while the three-month-ahead forward rate never violated 
it. On the same period, the spot rate violated the 92.75 gold export point by no more than 
0.53%; the one-month-ahead forward rate by no more than 0.59%; while the three-month-ahead 
forward rate by no more than 0.67%.
Therefore, it would seem possible to argue that the violations o f the 92.17-92.75 gold 
points do not impair the interpretation o f the lira/pound exchange rate regime as a target zone, 
during the entire period when both currencies were pegged to gold.
The observations made for the lira/dollar case on the approximations involved in the 
estimation of gold transfer costs and their likely undervaluation apply also here.
A.1.3. Gold Point Estimates and Violations for the Lira/French Franc Exchange 
Rate
A Bank of Italy internal note dated 25 March 1933 reported the costs (inclusive of 
transportation and insurance) of a gold transfer via railway from Paris to Rome on behalf o f the 
Bank itself (see ASBI, Rapporti con l’Estero, pratt., n. 342, fasc. 8): 
from Paris to Ventimiglia 7.313%o
from Ventimiglia to Rome 5.000%o
interest loss (2 days; interest rate= 4.56%) 0.25%o
total cost l2.563%o
gold import point 73.502 lira = 100 French francs
gold export point 75.372 lira = 100 French francs
18 Actually, in this letter Nathan revised a previous gold point calculation, by modifying his interest rate
choice. Thus, the other cost elements were the same in the two documents.
19 The data on spot, one-month-ahead and three-month-ahead forward lira/pound exchange rates are end 
of month quotations from Einzig (1937, Appendix I).
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The figure for the Paris to Ventimiglia cost was said to have been determined on the basis 
of an offer made to the Bank of Italy by the French Lazard Bank on 17 October 1931. The 
figure for the Ventimiglia to Rome cost was said to have been determined on the basis of 
railway fares for the Bank. The 4.56% interest rate is higher than the Italian official discount 
rate at the time (4%) and also than the Italian private discount rate (4.25%).
Gold points were calculated in the note from the parity of 74.437 lira to 100 French francs 
under the assumption that gold import and export costs were equal.
Another Bank of Italy internal note, dated 1 April 1933, presented quite different gold 
transfer costs (ibidem). The document read “Calculation o f gold export point from Rome to 
Paris” and reported the following figures:




interest loss (3 days; interest rate= 5%) 0.42%o
total costs 4.32%o
gold export point 74.761 lira = 100 French francs
Under the assumption that gold import and export costs were the same, except for assay 
costs, the gold import point is 74.137 lira to 100 French francs.
These gold export costs are much lower than those reported in the previous document, 
written just a week earlier, for the opposite transfer. The transfer costs before the interest loss 
were 12.313%o in the previous document, while they are 3.99%o in this one. In this document, 
unlike in the previous one, no indication of the source of information on which the figures were 
calculated was supplied. This could be a sign that the previous document’s figures were more 
accurate.
Also the interest loss was calculated differently in the two notes: in the second one, both 
the number o f days and the interest rate were higher. However neither the official nor the 
private Italian discount rates rose in that week. For what concerns the journey length, if the 
additional day in the second document cannot be explained by the time needed to obtain the 
payment for the delivered gold at the Bank of France (the hypothesis o f delays in the payment 
o f gold by the Bank of France is at the moment just a conjecture and no evidence can be 
provided to support it), it would seem that the references to the information sources in the 
previous document could make the 2 day figure more accurate.
Finally, the gold export point in the first document did not account for assay costs. If  these 
were to be considered, the gold export point would raise from 75.372 lira to 75.391 lira to 100 
French francs.
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In a third Bank of Italy’s internal note, dated 3 April 1933, the costs (inclusive of 
transportation and insurance) o f a gold transfer via railway from Rome to Paris on behalf of 
private individuals were reported (ibidem):
from Rome to Ventimiglia
from Ventimiglia to Paris







76.004 lira = 100 French francs
The Rome to Ventimiglia cost was said to have been determined on the basis of railway 
fares for private individuals; the Ventimiglia to Paris cost had the same source as in the 25 
March 1933 document. No assay costs were mentioned. The interest loss was based on the same 
interest rate and journey time as in the 25 March 1933 document, thus no delays in gold 
payments by the Bank of France were considered.
The gold transfer costs for private individuals were estimated as almost 68% higher than 
those for the Bank of Italy.
Under the assumption that private individuals would have borne the same costs for gold 
import and export, the gold import point was 72.870 lira to 100 French francs.
While the costs that the Bank would have incurred implied a 1.26% allowed appreciation 
or depreciation o f the lira/French franc exchange rate with respect to its parity, the costs for 
private individuals implied a 2.11% allowed appreciation or depreciation. It would seem 
possible to argue that it is the costs for the private individuals that should be considered in 
estimating the gold points, because it would have been them who would have tried to exploit the 
profit opportunities arising from too large a depreciation or appreciation o f the exchange rate.
It should also be recalled that the Bank of Italy was not selling gold to private individuals, 
thus they would have needed to afford the additional costs o f obtaining gold from a third central 
bank before selling it to the Bank of France, if they wished to reap the profits arising from a 
large lira depreciation against the French franc.
A further set o f estimates can be based on the data presented in the letter sent on 4 
September 1933 to the Bank of Italy by a Swiss company, the “Societa Anonima Svizzera 
Luciano Franzosini” (ibidem). In this letter, the cost o f a gold transfer from Paris to Rome on 
behalf of the Bank itself, inclusive o f insurance, customs, packing, etc., that is o f all the costs up 
to delivery at the Bank of Italy, was set at 1.40%o. And the journey time was set at 3 days.
If the assumption that the Italian official discount rate (at the time, 3.5%) can be used to 
determine the interest loss is made, the gold import and export points are 74.314 and 74.566. If 
the lower French official discount rate (2.5%) is used, the gold points become 74.321 and 
74.560. Under both assumptions, these gold point estimates are the nearest to the parity: they 
allow only a 0.22-0.23% depreciation or appreciation.
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The interpretation of the lira/French franc exchange rate as a target zone is assessed firstly 
on the basis of the gold point estimates obtained by explicitly considering private individuals’ 
costs (i.e. 72.870 and 76.004 lira to 100 French francs).
The spot, one-month-ahead and three-month-ahead forward rates (end o f month exchange 
rate quotations published in Einzig, 1937, Appendix I) never violated the gold import point 
throughout the entire period January 1928-April 1934.
Between January 1928 and August 1931, the spot, one-month-ahead and three-month- 
ahead forward rates never violated even the gold export point. However, between September 
1931 and April 1934 the gold export point was substantially violated by all these exchange 
rates: the spot rate violations were no larger than 3.55%; the one-month-ahead forward rate 
violations no larger than 4.61%; the three-month-ahead forward rate violations no larger than 
7.11%.
It would seem possible to argue that the lira/French franc exchange rate regime was indeed 
a target zone until the pound crisis in September 1931. But it would seem difficult to support 
such an interpretation for the following period, even if, unlike in the lira/dollar case, it includes 
dates when the spot and the forward rates were lower than the 74.437 parity.
These conclusions do not seem to be impaired if  estimates o f gold points based on lower 
costs are considered. Between January 1928 and August 1931, the spot rate violated in two 
months the highest gold import point estimate (i.e. 73.314) but it never violated the second 
highest (i.e. 74.137); while neither of the forward rates violated even the highest gold import 
point estimate. In the same period, the spot rate violated only the lowest gold export point 
estimate (i.e. 74.566), by less than 1%, but it never violated the second highest (i.e. 74.761); 
while the one-month-ahead forward rate just violated the 75.372 estimate and the three-month- 
ahead forward rate violated this 75.372 estimate by no more than 0.30%.
The observation that none o f the gold point estimates includes the additional costs arising 
from the convertibility restrictions would appear to strengthen the argument in favour of a target 
zone interpretation o f the lira/French franc exchange rate regime between January 1928 and 
August 1931.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that also in the lira/French franc case the reliability o f the 
gold point estimates is affected by the unresolved problem o f the interest rate choice.
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Appendix A.2: Determinants of Devaluation Expectations: Sources and 
Construction of the Dataset
The main criterion in the choice o f the series by which to measure the variables considered
as possible determinants o f devaluation expectations is that they have to have been available to 
financial markets’ agents when they formed their expectations.
The employed data on central banks’ reserves are based on: for Italy, total reserves (i.e. 
gold plus gold currencies and gold currency denominated assets) at the Bank of Italy, as from 
ISTAT, Bollettino Mensile di Statistica, Rome, various issues (the same data are available also 
from League of Nations, Monthly Bulletin o f Statistics, Geneve, various issues); for US, gold 
reserves at the Federal Reserve Banks, as from League o f Nations, Monthly Bulletin o f 
Statistics, Geneve, various issues; for UK, gold reserves at the Bank of England, as from League 
o f Nations, Monthly Bulletin o f Statistics, Geneve, various issues; for France, gold reserves plus 
reserves in foreign assets (including funds available at sight and negotiable securities), as from 
League o f Nations, Monthly Bulletin o f Statistics, Geneve, various issues.
The first difference o f the logarithm of each of the monthly series is used to calculate the 
differentials between reserves’ growth rates in Italy and the other three countries.
The month to month growth rate is preferred to growth rates based on longer time intervals 
for all the relevant regressors to maximise the length o f the sample period on which the 
equations for the determinants of devaluation expectations are estimated, given that for a large 
number o f regressors data are available only from January 1928. The disadvantage o f this 
choice is that a growth rate based on a shorter period is affected by a larger noise component.
The inflation rate for each o f the four countries is calculated as first difference of the 
logarithm o f a wholesale price index. The sources o f these price indices are: for Italy, Cotula 
and Spaventa (1993, Tav. A. 15. This index is based for 1928-1929 on ex-post calculations, and 
for 1930-1931 on monthly interpolations that could have been implicitly done at the time. 
However, for the entire period, similar monthly series o f wholesale price indices were published 
by ISTAT, Bollettino Mensile di Statistica, Rome, various issues); for US, UK and France, 
League o f Nations, Monthly Bulletin o f Statistics, Geneve, various issues.
The employed growth rates o f monetary aggregates are first differences o f the logarithms 
of the following series: for Italy, banknotes circulation as from ISTAT, Bollettino Mensile di 
Statistica, Rome, various issues; for US, Ml as from Friedman and Schwartz (1970, Table 1, 
Col. 8); for UK, M l as from Capie and Webber (1985, Table 1.(2), Col. I); for France, 
(seasonally unadjusted) M2 as from Patat and Lutffalla (1986, Table 1 o f the appendix).
The values of exports and imports published for all four countries in League o f Nations, 
Monthly Bulletin o f Statistics, Geneve, various issues, are used to calculate the logarithms of the 
exports over imports ratios. Values rather than quantity indices are chosen because the regressor 
is interpreted as a measure o f the effect o f international trade on reserves.
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The employed data on output growth rates are first differences of the logarithms of the 
following series: for Italy, from January 1929 to August 1931 a proxy o f the Ministry of 
Corporations’ industrial production index (published from 1934 both in Ministry of 
Corporations, Sindacato e Corporazione, Rome, various issues, and in ISTAT, Bollettino 
Mensile di Statistica, Rome, various issues) and for 1928 a backwards prediction o f the same 
index, calculated as described below, in Appendix A.2.1; for US and France, monthly indices of 
industrial production as from League o f Nations, Monthly Bulletin o f Statistics, Geneve, various 
issues; for UK, a monthly index o f business activity calculated as described below, in Appendix 
A.2.2.
The employed data on bankruptcies and protests are the first differences o f the logarithms 
o f the indices for these variables published in ASSONIME, Bollettino di Notizie Economiche, 
Rome, various issues.
The employed data on stock market indices are the first differences o f the logarithms o f the 
general index and the index for the banking sector published in ISTAT, Bollettino Mensile di 
Statistica, Rome, various issues (series calculated by Prof. Bachi).
A.2.1. The Italian Index of Industrial Production
When, in 1934, the Ministry o f Corporations began to calculate a monthly series for
industrial production, it set January 1929 as starting date o f the series. The criteria on which 
these calculations were based were described in both the periodicals that published the series: 
briefly in ISTAT, Bollettino Mensile di Statistica, Rome, August 1934 and following issues, and 
more in detail in Ministry o f Corporations, Sindacato e Corporazione, Rome, 1-2, July-August 
1934 and following issues. These sources explained that the index was based on two successive 
aggregations, via weighted geometric means, of 32 elementary components (the weights being 
workers employed in the various industries in the first aggregation, and employed workers 
combined with value added in the second one).
Despite the fact that financial markets’ agents could not know this index during the period 
January 1928- August 1931, they may have used the partial indicators o f industrial production 
that were published at the time to implicitly calculate a proxy o f a more comprehensive 
industrial production index.
Hence here the fitted values from the regression of the Ministry of Corporations’ industrial 
production index on a set of indicators available at the time are used to calculate the differentials 
between measures o f output growth for Italy and the other countries for the sub-period starting 
in January 1929, while the predicted values from the same model are considered for 1928.
The model specification chosen to proxy (from January 1929 onwards) and predict 
backwards (for 1928) the values o f the industrial production index is:
(A.2.1) indprod t = y 0 +  / , e l p w t + ^ 2steelt + / 3w kdhrst + / 4em plt + e t ,
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where: all the variables are in logarithms; indprod is the Ministry o f Corporations’ industrial 
production index; elpw is an index of production plus imports of electrical power (source: 
ISTAT, Bollettino Mensile di Statistica, Rome, various issues); steel is an index o f steel 
production (same source); wkdhrs is an index of the total number of worked hours in the 
industrial sector (based on the surveys of the industrial labour market carried out by the 
confederation of industrialists, and published, as mentioned in Section 2.3, both in ASSONIME, 
Bollettino di Notizie Economiche, Rome, various issues, and in ISTAT, Bollettino Mensile di 
Statistica, Rome, various issues); empl is an index o f the number of workers employed in the 
industrial sector (based on the same surveys and calculated by Zamagni, 1994, Tab. 11).
The OLS estimation results relative to the specification in equation (A.2.1) are presented in
Table A.2.1:














number of observations 32
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The high R suggests that financial markets’ operators at the time may have been able to 
implicitly calculate quite a good proxy of the industrial production index that the Ministry of 
Corporations began to publish only in 1934.
Furthermore the predictions generated by this model are consistent with the information on 
industrial production available at an annual frequency. In particular the indices calculated by 
both ISTAT and OEEC indicate that the average industrial production in 1928 was slightly 
smaller than that in 1929 (the figures being 99 for 1928 and 100 for 1929 according to OEEC; 
98 for 1928 and 100 for 1929 according to ISTAT. See, respectively, OEEC, Statistiques 
industrielles 1900-1955, Paris, 1956, Addendum, and Ercolani, 1969). A slight increase in 
industrial production from 1928 to 1929 is observed also if the predictions generated by the 
model presented above for 1928 are compared with the actual data for 1929 (or the fitted values 
generated by the model): the predicted 1928 peak is at 116.70 while the actual peak in 1929 is at 
116.90 (and the fitted values’ 1929 peak at 116.91).
The comparison with the available annual data allows in particular to prefer the 
specification in equation (A.2.1) to that which includes also a linear trend among the regressors: 
the model with trend predicts not only a 1928 peak larger than the actual 1929 one (124.04 with 
respect to 116.90), but also 1928 values generally higher than the actual 1929 ones.
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The predicted and fitted values generated by the model in equation (A.2.1) are presented in 
Figure A.2.1, together with the published data.
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A.2.2. The UK In d ex  o f  B u s in e s s  A c tiv ity
For the UK, no monthly series on industrial production is available for the considered
period. However, a quarterly series was published by League of Nations, Monthly Bulletin o f  
Statistics, Geneve, various issues, and Economist calculated a seasonally adjusted monthly 
series for an index of business activity. This second index was intended to be “an attempt to 
measure changes in the economic activity of the country quantitatively and not in terms of 
values; in other words, it [was] intended to give an approximate indication of variations in the 
“rear’ national income” (Economist, Trade Supplement, No. 145, June 29, 1935, p. 42). The 
index was regularly published starting from Economist, Trade Supplement, October 21, 1933, 
where the method for its construction was first described. This method was then subjected to 
minor changes in Economist, Trade Supplement, No. 145, June 29, 1935 (mainly, the number of 
component series was slightly reduced, and a geometric mean rather than an arithmetic one was 
used for the aggregation).
Here a seasonally unadjusted index of business activity for the UK, based on the method 
and most of the components indicated by Economist, Trade Supplement, No. 145, June 29, 
1935, is calculated for the period January 1928-August 1931 and is then used in the equations 
for the determinants of devaluation expectations.
Despite the fact that Economist's index of business activity was not actually available to 
contemporaries in the period January 1928-August 1931 (as the seasonally unadjusted version 
calculated here), it may be argued that agents in the financial markets could have implicitly had 
a knowledge o f the trends in economic activity not very different from that implied by such 
index. Firstly they knew the quarterly industrial production index published by League of
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Nations, Monthly Bulletin o f Statistics, Geneve, various issues. Furthermore it would seem 
reasonable to assume that they broadly shared the Economist’s opinion about which variables 
could be used as indicators of economic activity (the component series were published 
throughout the considered period) and their relative importance (expressed by the weights with 
which they entered the Economist’s index). Hence the use o f the seasonally unadjusted index of 
business activity, calculated as described below, can be argued not to constitute a substantial 
violation of the earlier stated criterion for the choice o f the series via which to measure the 
regressors in the equations for the determinants of devaluation expectations, that is their 
presence in the financial markets’ agents’ information set.
The component series with the largest weight in the Economist’s business activity index 
(see Trade Supplement, No. 145, June 29, 1935) is that for employment. As in that index, also in 
the seasonally unadjusted one calculated here the employment series is based on the figures on 
workers insured against unemployment in Great Britain and Northern Ireland who are not 
unemployed (either temporarily stopped or wholly unemployed) published monthly in the 
Ministry o f Labour Gazette, various issues. Unlike in the Economist case, no seasonal 
adjustment is made here.
A series on coal production (published in the London and Cambridge Economic Service 
Bulletin, various issues) is used instead o f that on coal consumption employed by Economist.
The index for production o f electricity calculated by Economist (as described in the July 
10, 1926 issue, pp. 57-58) and regularly published throughout the sample period is used as a 
proxy for the industrial consumption o f electricity measure included in Economist’s index. This 
choice is based on the observation that the production o f electricity index was calculated so as to 
be a measure o f “the trend o f electrical power production in the principal industrial centres of 
Britain” (Economist, July 10, 1926, p. 58) and hence “to show the fluctuations in activity in 
those firms that had adopted electricity as a motive force”(p. 57).
Merchandise on railways is measured via the same series on tonnage o f freight carried on 
standard-gauge lines of Great Britain, less coal and coke, used in Economist’s index (and 
regularly published in Economist, Trade Supplement), because that component was seasonally 
unadjusted also there.
Building activity is measured on the basis of the same figures on the values o f building 
plans approved by local authorities in England and Whales (monthly published in the Ministry 
o f Labour Gazette) used in Economist’s index, deflated by the Board o f Trade’s general 
wholesale price index (published for example in the London and Cambridge Economic Service 
Bulletin, various issues).
The sum of the series on iron and steel production (published in the London and 
Cambridge Economic Service Bulletin, various issues) is used instead of that o f iron and steel 
consumption employed by Economist.
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The series of imports o f raw materials and exports of UK manufactures (in values, 
published in the London and Cambridge Economic Service Bulletin, various issues), deflated 
respectively by the Board o f Trade’s wholesale price indices for materials and general (same 
source), are also used.
Shipping movements are measured by the data on the tonnage o f ships with cargoes 
entering and leaving British ports (published in the London and Cambridge Economic Service 
Bulletin, various issues).
Finally a series o f the total clearings granted in Town and Country by the London Bankers’ 
Clearing House (as from the London and Cambridge Economic Service Bulletin, various issues) 
is considered. A price index similar to that employed by Economist is calculated to deflate it, as 
weighted arithmetic average o f the London and Cambridge Economic Service Bulletin's index 
of wages (with a weight o f 2), the Ministry o f Labour’s cost o f living index (published in the 
London and Cambridge Economic Service Bulletin, with a weight o f 2), and the Board of 
Trade’s general wholesale price index (same source, with a weight of 1).
For each o f the employed component series, a transformation into an index whose average 
over 1929 equals 100 and the same weight as in the Economist's index are used in the geometric 
average (the only exception being the weight for bank clearings). Hence the weights are: 10 for 
employment, 4 for coal production, 2 for electricity production, 4 for merchandise on railways, 
2 for building activity, 2 for iron plus steel production, 2 for imports of raw materials, 3 for 
exports of manufactures, 2 for shipping movements, and 4 for bank clearings. Therefore, the 
component series’ weights’ sum is 35 for the index calculated here, while it was 42 for the 
Economist's index.
The additional series included in the Economist's index but not in that calculated here are: 
commercial motor vehicles in use (with a weight o f 2), postal traffic receipts (with a weight of 
3), and consumption o f cotton (with a weight of 1). Furthermore the Economist's index included 
two series o f bank clearings: metropolitan, country and provincial bank clearings (with a weight 
of 4), and town clearings (with a weight of 1).
The business activity index calculated here is presented together with the quarterly index 
of industrial production published in League o f Nations, Monthly Bulletin o f Statistics, Geneve, 
various issues, in Figure A.2.2.
The path o f the business activity index is so close to that of the industrial production one to 
justify the assumption that an index similar to the business activity one could be in the financial 









Figure A.2.2: UK Indices of Business Activity (Calculated Here) and Industrial 
Production (League of Nations) (1929 average=100)
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